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Intermarium

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Józef Piłsudski's post-World War I Intermarium concept ranging from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Mediterranean and Black Seas in the south. In light green: eastern parts of Ukrainian and Belarusian lands incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922

Intermarium (Polish: Międzymorze, Polish pronunciation: [mʲɛnd͡zɨˈmɔʐɛ]) was a post-World War I geopolitical plan conceived by Józef Piłsudski to unite former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth lands within a single polity. The plan went through several iterations, some of which anticipated the inclusion of neighbouring states. The proposed multinational polity would have incorporated territories lying between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas, hence the name Intermarium (Latin for "Between-Seas").

Prospectively a federation[1][2][3][4][5] of Central and Eastern European countries, the post-World War I Intermarium plan pursued by Piłsudski sought to recruit to the proposed federation the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), Finland,[6] Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.[7][8] The Polish name Międzymorze (from między, "between"; and morze, "sea"), meaning "Between-Seas", was rendered into Latin as Intermarium.[9]

The proposed federation was meant to emulate the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, that, from the end of the 16th century to the end of the 18th, had united the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Intermarium complemented Piłsudski's other geopolitical vision, Prometheism, whose goal was the dismemberment of the Russian Empire and that Empire's divestment of its territorial acquisitions.[10][11][12][13]

Intermarium was perceived by some Lithuanians as a threat to their newly established independence, and by some Ukrainians as a threat to their aspirations for independence,[14][15][16] and while France backed the proposal, it was opposed by the Soviet Union and by most other Western powers.[17][18][19] Within two decades of the failure of Piłsudski's grand scheme, all the countries that he had viewed as candidates for membership in the Intermarium federation had fallen to the Soviet Union or to Nazi Germany, except for Finland (which suffered some territorial losses in the 1939–40 Winter War with the Soviet Union).

Precedents

The Polish–Lithuanian union at its greatest extent, 1386–1434
The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth at its greatest extent, 1635

Commonwealth

Main articles: Polish–Lithuanian–Ruthenian Commonwealth and Treaty of Hadiach

A Polish–Lithuanian union and military alliance had come about as a mutual response to common threats posed by the Teutonic Order, the Golden Horde, and the Grand Duchy of Moscow. The alliance was first established in 1385 by the Union of Krewo,[20] solemnized by the marriage of Poland's Queen Jadwiga and Lithuania's Grand Duke Jogaila of the Gediminid dynasty, who became King Władysław II Jagiełło of Poland.

A longer-lasting federation subsequently came about in 1569 in the form of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, an arrangement that lasted until 1795, i.e., until the Third Partition of the Poland.

The Polish–Lithuanian alliance thus lasted a total of 410 years, and constituted at times the largest state in Europe.

Under the Commonwealth, proposals were advanced to establish expanded, Polish–Lithuanian-Muscovite or Polish–Lithuanian–Ruthenian Commonwealths. Though the Commonwealth temporarily controlled parts of Russia and governed much of Ruthenia for centuries, these proposals were never implemented at a constitutional level.

Adam Czartoryski's plan

Between the November and January Uprisings, in the period between 1832 and 1861, the idea of resurrecting an updated Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was advocated by Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, residing in exile at the Hôtel Lambert in Paris.[21]

In his youth, Czartoryski had fought against Russia in the Polish–Russian War of 1792; he would have done so again in the Kościuszko Uprising of 1794 had he not been arrested at Brussels on his way back to Poland. Subsequently, in 1795, he and his younger brother had been commanded to enter the Imperial Russian Army, and Catherine the Great had been so favourably impressed with them that she had restored to them part of their confiscated estates. Adam Czartoryski subsequently served the Russian emperors Paul and Alexander I as a diplomat and foreign minister, establishing an anti-French coalition during the Napoleonic Wars. Czartoryski, one of the leaders of the Polish November 1830 Uprising, had been sentenced to death after its suppression by Russia, but was eventually allowed to go into exile in France.

Coat of arms for a proposed Polish–Lithuanian–Ruthenian Commonwealth during the January 1863 Uprising: Polish White Eagle, Lithuanian Pagaunė, and Ruthenian Archangel Michael

In Paris the "visionary"[22] statesman and former friend, confidant, and de facto foreign minister of Alexander I acted as the "uncrowned king and unacknowledged foreign minister" of a nonexistent Poland.[23]

In his book, Essai sur la diplomatie (Essay on Diplomacy), completed in 1827 but published only in 1830, Czartoryski observed that, "Having extended her sway south and west, and being by the nature of things unreachable from the east and north, Russia becomes a source of constant threat to Europe." He argued that Russia would have done better cultivating "friends rather than slaves". He also identified a future threat from Prussia and urged the incorporation of East Prussia into a resurrected Poland.[24]

Czartoryski's diplomatic efforts anticipated Piłsudski's Prometheist project in linking efforts for Polish independence with similar movements of other subjugated nations in Europe, as far east as the Caucasus Mountains, most notably in Georgia.[25]

Czartoryski aspired above all to reconstitute—with French, British, and Ottoman support—a sort of "pan-Slavic" Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth federated with the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, and all the South Slavs of the future Yugoslavia. Poland, in his concept, could have mediated the conflicts between Hungary and the Slavs, and between Hungary and Romania.[26] The plan seemed achievable[27] during the period of national revolutions in 1848–49 but foundered on lack of western support, on Hungarian intransigence toward the Czechs, Slovaks, and Romanians, and on the rise of German nationalism.[28]

Marian Kamil Dziewanowski writes that "the Prince's endeavour constitutes a [vital] link [between] the 16th-century Jagiellon [federative prototype] and Józef Piłsudski's federative-Prometheist program [that was to follow after World War I]."[26]

Józef Piłsudski's Międzymorze

Józef Piłsudski
Piłsudski's initial plan for Intermarium: a resurrected Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth

Józef Piłsudski's strategic goal was to resurrect an updated, democratic form of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, while working for the disintegration of the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, into its ethnic constituents.[29] (The latter was his Prometheist project.[29]) Piłsudski saw an Intermarium federation as a counterweight to Russian and German imperialism.[30][31]

According to Dziewanowski, the plan was never expressed in systematic fashion but instead relied on Piłsudski's pragmatic instincts.[32] According to British scholar George Sanford, about the time of the Polish–Soviet War of 1920 Piłsudski recognised that the plan was not feasible.[33]

Opposition

Piłsudski's plan faced opposition from virtually all quarters. The Soviets, whose sphere of influence was directly threatened, worked to thwart the Intermarium agenda.[18] The Allied Powers assumed that Bolshevism was only a temporary threat and did not want to see their important (from the balance-of-power viewpoint) traditional ally, Russia, weakened. They resented Piłsudski's refusal to aid their White allies, viewed Piłsudski with suspicion, saw his plans as unrealistic, and urged Poland to confine itself to areas of clear-cut Polish ethnicity.[34][35][36] The Lithuanians,[35][37] who had re-established their independence in 1918, were unwilling to join; the Ukrainians, similarly seeking independence,[19] likewise feared that Poland might again subjugate them;[35] and the Belarusians, though nearly not as interested in independence as Ukraine, were still fearful of Polish domination.[35] The chances for Piłsudski's scheme were not enhanced by a series of post-World War I wars and border conflicts between Poland and its neighbors in disputed territories—the Polish–Soviet War, the Polish–Lithuanian War, the Polish–Ukrainian War, and border conflicts between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Piłsudski's concept was opposed within Poland itself, where National Democracy leader Roman Dmowski[38][39] argued for an ethnically homogeneous Poland in which minorities would be Polonised.[40][41] Many Polish politicians, including Dmowski, opposed the idea of a multiethnic federation, preferring instead to work for a unitary Polish nation state.[39] Sanford has described Piłsudski's policies after his resumption of power in 1926 as similarly focusing on the Polonisation of the country's Eastern Slavic minorities and on the centralisation of power.[33]

While some scholars accept at face value the democratic principles claimed by Piłsudski for his federative plan,[42] others view such claims with skepticism, pointing out a coup d'état in 1926 when Piłsudski assumed nearly dictatorial powers.[13][43] In particular, his project is viewed unfavourably by most Ukrainian historians, with Oleksandr Derhachov arguing that the federation would have created a greater Poland in which the interests of non-Poles, especially Ukrainians, would have received short shrift.[15]

Some historians hold that Piłsudski, who argued that "There can be no independent Poland without an independent Ukraine", may have been more interested in splitting Ukraine from Russia than in assuring Ukrainians' welfare.[44][45] He did not hesitate to use military force to expand Poland's borders to Galicia and Volhynia, crushing a Ukrainian attempt at self-determination in disputed territories east of the Bug River which contained a substantial Polish presence[46] (a Polish majority mainly in cities such as Lwów, surrounded by a rural Ukrainian majority).

Speaking of Poland's future frontiers, Piłsudski said: "All that we can gain in the west depends on the Entente—on the extent to which it may wish to squeeze Germany", while in the east "there are doors that open and close, and it depends on who forces them open and how far".[47] In the eastern chaos, the Polish forces set out to expand as far as feasible. On the other hand, Poland had no interest in joining the western intervention in the Russian Civil War[46] or in conquering Russia itself.[48]

Failure

Piłsudski's revised Intermarium plan
Józef Beck's plan for "Third Europe", an alliance of Poland, Romania, and Hungary

In the aftermath of the Polish–Soviet War (1919–1921), and the establishment of the Ukrainian SSR, Piłsudski's concept of a federation of Central and Eastern European countries, based on a Polish-Ukrainian axis, lost any chance of realisation.[49]

Piłsudski next contemplated a federation or alliance with the Baltic and Balkan states. This plan envisioned a Central European union including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, the Baltic states, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece—thus stretching not only west-east from the Baltic to the Black Sea, but north-south from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.[49] This project also failed: Poland was distrusted by Czechoslovakia and Lithuania; and while it had relatively good relations with the other countries, they had tensions with their neighbors, making it virtually impossible to create in Central Europe a large block of countries that all had good relations with each other. In the end, in place of a large federation, only a Polish–Romanian alliance was established, beginning in 1921.[50] In comparison, Czechoslovakia had more success with its Little Entente (1920–1938) with Romania and Yugoslavia, supported by France.

Piłsudski died in 1935. A later, much reduced version of his concept was attempted by interwar Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck, a protégé of Piłsudski. His proposal, during the late 1930s, of a "Third Europe"—an alliance of Poland, Romania, and Hungary—gained little ground before World War II supervened.[49] Beck's Third Europe concept failed to achieve any traction because Germany was the world's second largest economy and all of eastern Europe was dominated economically by the Reich.[51] For economic reasons, the tendency in eastern Europe was to follow the lead of Berlin rather than Warsaw.[51]

Disregarding the 1932 Polish–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet Union allied itself with Nazi Germany to divide Central and Eastern Europe between them.[52] According to some historians, it was the failure to create a strong counterweight to Germany and the Soviet Union, as proposed by Piłsudski, that doomed Intermarium's prospective member countries to their fates in World War II.[30][31][53][54]

World War II and after

Władysław Sikorski

The concept of a "Central [and Eastern] European Union"—a triangular geopolitical entity anchored in the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic or Aegean Seas—was revived during World War II in Władysław Sikorski's Polish Government-in-Exile.

A first step toward its implementation—1942 discussions among the Greek, Yugoslav, Polish, and Czechoslovak governments-in- exile regarding prospective Greek–Yugoslav and Polish–Czechoslovak federations—ultimately foundered on Soviet opposition, which led to Czech hesitation and Allied indifference or hostility.[49]

A declaration by the Polish Underground State in that period called for the creation of a Central and Eastern European federal union undominated by any one state.[55][56]

On 12 May 2011, the Visegrád Group countries (The Republic of Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Hungary) announced the formation of a Visegrád Battlegroup under Polish command. The battlegroup was in place by 2016 as an independent force, not part of the NATO command. In addition, starting in 2013, the four countries were to begin joint military exercises under the auspices of the NATO Response Force. Some scholars saw this as a first step toward close Central European regional cooperation.[57]

On 6 August 2015, Polish President Andrzej Duda, in his inaugural address, announced plans to build a regional alliance of Central European states, modeled on the Intermarium concept.[58][59][60] In 2016 the Three Seas Initiative held an initial summit meeting in Dubrovnik, Croatia.[61] The Three Seas Initiative has 12 member states along a north–south axis from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria.

See also

References

  1. ^ Aviel Roshwald, "Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East and Russia, 1914–1923", Routledge (UK), 2001, ISBN 0-415-17893-2, p. 37
  2. ^ Richard K Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918–1921, McGill-Queen's Press, 1992, ISBN 0-7735-0828-7, p. 59.
  3. ^ James H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men, Transaction Publishers, ISBN 0-7658-0471-9, p. 432
  4. ^ Andrzej Paczkowski, The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom, Penn State Press, 2003, ISBN 0-271-02308-2, p. 10
  5. ^ David Parker, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001, ISBN 0-393-02025-8, p. 194
  6. ^ Mark Hewitson, Matthew D'Auria Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917–1957, 2012, p. 191 "... of the other national movements that had found themselves included in Piłsudski's project, especially the Lithuanians. ... The somewhat nostalgic image of 'Intermarium', the land of cultural and historical diversity destroyed by the wave of ..."
  7. ^ Miloslav Rechcígl, Studies in Czechoslovak history, Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America, 1976, Volume 1, p. 282. "This new policy, which was labeled the Intermarium, or Third Europe Project, called for the establishment of ..."
  8. ^ Fritz Taubert, "The myth of Munich 1938", 2002 p. 351 "... range détente with Germany and in the chance of creating a Polish-led 'Third Europe' or 'Intermarium' as illusory."
  9. ^ Tomasz Piesakowski, Akcja niepodległościowa na terenie międzynarodowym, 1945–1990, 1999, p. 149: "... przyjmując łacińskie określenie 'Intermarium' (Międzymorze). Podkreślano, że 'Intermarium' to nie tylko pojęcie obszaru geopolitycznego zamieszkanego przez 16 narodów, ale idea wspólnoty wszystkich wolnych narodów tego obszaru."
  10. ^
  11. ^
  12. ^ "Pilsudski hoped to build not merely a Polish nation state but a greater federation of peoples under the aegis of Poland which would replace Russia as the great power of Eastern Europe. Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine were all to be included. His plan called for a truncated and vastly reduced Russia, a plan which excluded negotiations prior to military victory." Richard K Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918–1992, p. 59, McGill-Queen's Press, 1992, ISBN 0-7735-0828-7.
  13. ^ a b "Pilsudski's program for a federation of independent states centered on Poland; in opposing the imperial power of both Russia and Germany it was in many ways a throwback to the romantic Mazzinian nationalism of Young Poland in the early nineteenth century." James H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men, p. 432, Transaction Publishers, ISBN 0-7658-0471-9
  14. ^ Oleksa Pidlutsky, "Figures of the 20th century. Józef Piłsudski: the Chief who Created a State for Himself", Zerkalo Nedeli [Mirror Weekly], 3–9 February 2001, available online in Russian Archived 2005-11-26 at the Wayback Machine and in Ukrainian Archived 2005-11-07 at the Wayback Machine.
  15. ^ a b "The essence of [Józef Piłsudski's 'federalist' program] was that after the overthrow of tsardom and the disintegration of the Russian empire, a large, strong and mighty Poland was to be created in Eastern Europe. It would be the reincarnation of the Rzeczpospolita on 'federative' principles. It was to include the Polish, Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands. The leading role, of course, was to be given to the Polish ethnic, political, economic and cultural element. ... As such two influential and popular political doctrines with regard to Ukraine—the 'incorporationist' and the 'federalist'—even before the creation of Polish statehood, were based on ignoring the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination and put forward claims to rule over the Ukrainian territories ..." "Ukraine in Polish concepts of foreign policy", in Oleksandr Derhachov (ed.), Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis, Kyiv, 1996, ISBN 966-543-040-8.
  16. ^ Roman Szporluk, Imperiia ta natsii, Kyiv, Dukh i Litera, 2001, ISBN 966-7888-05-3, section II (in Ukrainian)
  17. ^ "Intermarium Alliance – Will the idea become reality?". www.unian.info. Retrieved 2015-11-01.
  18. ^ a b "Between Imperial Temptation And Anti-Imperial Function In Eastern European Politics: Poland From The Eighteenth To Twenty-First Century". Andrzej Nowak. Accessed September 14, 2007.
  19. ^ a b Eidintas, Alfonsas; Zalys, Vytautas (1999). Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918-1940. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-312-22458-5.
  20. ^ "Union of Krewo (Act of Kreva)". Polish History. 2022-08-13. Retrieved 2023-02-24.
  21. ^ Marian Kamil Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy" ("A Polish Pioneer of a United Europe"), Gwiazda Polarna (Pole Star), Sept. 17, 2005, pp. 10–11.
  22. ^ "The Prince [Czartoryski] thus shows himself a visionary (emphasis added], the outstanding Polish statesman of the period between the November and January Uprisings." Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," p. 11.
  23. ^ Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," p. 10.
  24. ^ Dziewanowski, Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy, p. 10.
  25. ^ Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," pp. 10–11.
  26. ^ a b Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," p. 11.
  27. ^ "Adam Czartoryski's great plan, which had seemed close to realization (emphasis added) during the Spring of Nations in 1848–49, failed..." Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," p. 11.
  28. ^ Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy", p. 11.
  29. ^ a b Jonathan Levy (6 June 2007). The Intermarium: Wilson, Madison, & East Central European Federalism. Universal-Publishers. pp. 166–167. ISBN 978-1-58112-369-2. Retrieved 11 April 2011.
  30. ^ a b Janusz Cisek (26 September 2002). Kościuszko, we are here!: American pilots of the Kościuszko Squadron in defense of Poland, 1919-1921. McFarland. p. 47. ISBN 978-0-7864-1240-2. Retrieved 11 April 2011.
  31. ^ a b Joshua B. Spero (2004). Bridging the European divide: middle power politics and regional security dilemmas. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 36. ISBN 978-0-7425-3553-4. Retrieved 11 April 2011.
  32. ^ Kenneth F. Lewalski (March 1972). "Review of Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 1918–1922, by M. K. Dziewanowski". Journal of Modern History. Accessed September 16, 2007.
  33. ^ a b George Sanford, Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics since 1989. Palgrave Macmillan 2002. ISBN 0-333-77475-2. pp. 5–6.
  34. ^ Adam Bruno Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era, Beacon Press, 1989, ISBN 0-8070-7005-X, p. 185
  35. ^ a b c d "Polish-Soviet War: Battle of Warsaw". Archived 2007-10-07 at the Wayback Machine. Accessed September 30, 2007.
  36. ^ Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, Polish edition, Wydawnictwo Znak, 1997, ISBN 83-7006-761-1, p.228
  37. ^ Piotr Łossowski, Konflikt polsko-litewski 1918–1920, Książka i Wiedza, 1995, ISBN 83-05-12769-9, p.13–16 and p. 36
  38. ^ (in Polish) "Wojna polsko-bolszewicka". Archived 2013-11-11 at the Wayback Machine. Internetowa encyklopedia PWN. Accessed 27 October 2006.
  39. ^ a b "Pilsudski dreamed of drawing all the nations situated between Germany and Russia into an enormous federation in which Poland, by virtue of its size, would be the leader, while Dmowski wanted to see a unitary Polish state, in which other Slav peoples would become assimilated." Andrzej Paczkowski, The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom, p. 10, Penn State Press, 2003, ISBN 0-271-02308-2
  40. ^ Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, Elisabeth Glaser, The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, Cambridge University Press, 1998, ISBN 0-521-62132-1, p.314
  41. ^ Roman Dmowski has been quoted as saying: "Wherever we can multiply our forces and our civilizational efforts, absorbing other elements, no law can prohibit us from doing so, as such actions are our duty." J. Tomaszewski, Kresy Wschodnie w polskiej mysli politycznej XIX i XX w./Między Polską etniczną a historyczną. Polska myśl polityczna XIX i XX wieku, vol. 6, Warsaw, 1988, p. 101. Cited in Oleksandr Derhachov, ibid.
  42. ^ Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East and Russia, 1914–1923, 2001, Routledge (UK), ISBN 0-415-24229-0, p. 49[permanent dead link‍]
  43. ^ Yohanan Cohen, Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Confrontation, SUNY Press, 1989, ISBN 0-7914-0018-2 p. 65
  44. ^ "The newly founded Polish state cared much more about the expansion of its borders to the east and southeast ('between the seas') than about helping the dying [Ukrainian] state of which Petlura was de facto dictator." "A Belated Idealist", Zerkalo Nedeli [Mirror Weekly], 22–28 May 2004. Available online in Russian Archived 2006-01-16 at the Wayback Machine and in Ukrainian Archived 2007-03-10 at the Wayback Machine. Piłsudski is quoted to have said: "After Polish independence we will see about Poland's size." (ibid)
  45. ^ A month before his death, Pilsudski told an aide: "My life is lost. I failed to create a Ukraine free of the Russians." (in Russian and Ukrainian) Oleksa Pidlutskyi, "Józef Piłsudski: The Chief who Created Himself a State", in Postati XX stolittia [Figures of the 20th century], Kyiv, 2004, ISBN 966-8290-01-1, LCCN 2004-440333. reprinted in Zerkalo Nedeli [Mirror Weekly], Kyiv, 3–9 February 2001, in Russian Archived 2005-11-26 at the Wayback Machine and in Ukrainian Archived 2005-11-07 at the Wayback Machine.
  46. ^ a b Anna M. Cienciala, 2004. "The Rebirth of Poland" Archived 2020-11-08 at the Wayback Machine (lecture notes). University of Kansas. Asccessed 2 June 2006.
  47. ^ MacMillan, Margaret, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, Random House, 2003, ISBN 0-375-76052-0, p. 212
  48. ^ Joseph Pilsudski. Interview by Dymitr Merejkowsky, 1921. Translated from the Russian by Harriet E Kennedy B. A. London & Edinburgh, Sampson Low, Marston & Co Ltd 1921. Piłsudski said: "Poland can have nothing to do with the restoration of old Russia. Anything rather than that–even Bolshevism".
  49. ^ a b c d Tadeusz Marczak, "Międzymorze wczoraj i dziś Archived 2009-03-03 at the Wayback Machine [Międzymorze Yesterday and Today], a Polish-language version of the paper, Myezhdumorye vchera i syevodnia [Międzymorze Yesterday and Today], published in Беларусь — Польша: путь к сотрудничеству (Belarus and Poland: the Path toward Cooperation. Materials of an International Scholarly Conference), Minsk, Belarus, 2005.
  50. ^ Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ISBN 0-521-83030-3
  51. ^ a b Greenwood, Sean (2002). "Danzig: the phantom crisis, 1939". In Gordon Martel (ed.). Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered A.J.P. Taylor and the Historians. London: Taylor & Francis. p. 227. ISBN 9781134714186.
  52. ^ Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, Intermarium: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas. Transaction: New Brunswick, New Jersey, 2012.
  53. ^ Alexandros Petersen (18 February 2011). The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West. ABC-CLIO. pp. 77–78. ISBN 978-0-313-39137-8. Retrieved 12 April 2011.
  54. ^ Alexandros Petersen (18 February 2011). The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West. ABC-CLIO. p. 153. ISBN 978-0-313-39137-8. Retrieved 12 April 2011.
  55. ^ Garliński, Józef (April 1975). "The Polish Underground State 1939–1945". Journal of Contemporary History. 10 (2): 246. doi:10.1177/002200947501000202. JSTOR 260146. S2CID 159844616.
  56. ^ Krystyna Kersten (1991). The establishment of Communist rule in Poland, 1943–1948. University of California Press. p. 50. ISBN 978-0-520-06219-1. Retrieved 8 April 2011.
  57. ^ "Visegrad: New European Military Force" Archived 2013-09-18 at the Wayback Machine, 16 May 2011.
  58. ^ "Duda's mission: Recover Pilsudski's Intermarium and Giedroyc's commitment to Ukraine". Geostrategy. Archived from the original on 2019-05-26. Retrieved 2015-08-18.
  59. ^ "Sojusz państw od Bałtyku po Morze Czarne? Duda chce odnowić międzywojenną ideę miedzymorza". 5 August 2015.
  60. ^ "Plan 'Intermarium' – Britain will support you, not against France, Ukraine and Poland will do". Archived from the original on 2019-04-17. Retrieved 2015-08-18.
  61. ^ "The Three Seas Initiative: Central and Eastern Europe takes charge of its own destiny". Visegrád Post. 28 August 2016. Retrieved 2017-07-04.

Bibliography

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  • Jonathan Levy, The Intermarium: Madison, Wilson, and East Central European Federalism, ISBN 1-58112-369-8, 2006 [1]
  • Sławomir Łukasiewicz, Trzecia Europa: Polska myśl federalistyczna w Stanach Zjednoczonych, 1940–1971 (Third Europe: Polish Federalist Thought in the United States, 1940–1971), Warsaw, Institute for National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej), 2010, ISBN 978-83-7629-137-6.
  • Anna Mazurkiewicz (University of Gdańsk), review of Sławomir Łukasiewicz, Trzecia Europa: Polska myśl federalistyczna w Stanach Zjednoczonych, 1940–1971, in Polish American Studies: A Journal of Polish American History and Culture, Published by the Polish American Historical Association, vol. LXVIII, no. 1 (Spring 2011), ISSN 0032-2806, pp. 77–81.
  • Piotr Okulewicz, Koncepcja "miedzymorza" w myśli i praktyce politycznej obozu Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1918–1926 (The Concept of Międzymorze in the Political Thought and Practice of Józef Piłsudski's Camp in the Years 1918–1926), Poznań, 2001, ISBN 83-7177-060-X.
  • Antoni Plutynski, We Are 115 Millions, with a foreword by Douglas Reed, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1944.
  • David J. Smith, Artis Pabriks, Aldis Purs, Thomas Lane, The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Routledge (UK), 2002, ISBN 0-415-28580-1 Google Print, p. 30 (also available here).

Further reading

  • Visegrad Group Defence Cooperation (published 1 May 2019) [2]
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