Usuario:Emilio Luque/Taller

Con datos del IV trimestre de 2023, la deuda acumulada por las Comunidades autónomas españolas es la que sigue, clasificadas por la deuda en relación a su PIB:^[1]​

La Constitución de 1812, en su artículo 325, Título VI, Capítulo II, trata sobre el gobierno político-económico de la provincia, para lo que diseña la Diputación provincial. Previamente, en el discurso preliminar se define a esta nueva institución en cuatro ocasiones como "cuerpo" y jamás con la función "asesora", sino deliberativa -palabra que no cita- dentro de una naturaleza corporativa. Si el artículo 324, que abre el capítulo II del Título VI, se dedica al jefe superior, « El gobierno político de las provincias residirá en el jefe superior, nombrado por el rey en cada uno de ellas », el artículo siguiente nombra por vez primera a las Diputaciones.

Una vez aprobada la Constitución, el gobierno incipiente español a la caída del imperio francés retomó el que había sido fruto de muchos debates y tanteamientos constitucionales, las diputaciones provinciales. Por medio de la Instrucción para el Gobierno económico-político de las provincias se ponen en marcha en las 18 provincias españolas y en 13 zonas marítimas una nueva institución para el gobierno interior: las Diputaciones provinciales.^[3]​

En Córdoba la primera instalación se realizó el 18 de agosto de 1813, cuando se iniciaron las sesiones de la nueva corporación, tal y como se recoge en la primera acta. En efecto, la Orden de 18 de diciembre de 1812 disponía el funcionamiento de las nuevas diputaciones, que se compondrían de un presidente, el llamado Gefe político de la provincia, el Intendente, cargo del Antiguo Régimen, más cinco o siete individuos en representación de los partidos de la provincia, que elegirían un Secretario de la institución para la jefatura del personal y un Depositario para la administración de los arbitrios y nuevos impuestos.

En el acta del 18 de agosto de 1813 se explicita el nombre de los miembros de la Diputación cordobesa:

• Presidente: Barón de Casa Davalillo, Jefe superior político.
• Diputados: José Garrido y Portilla, prebendado de la Catedral; Juan María del Valle Calvo, maestrante de Ronda; Juan Antonio de Fuente Centella, abogado y regidor de Castro del Río; Joaquín Pérez Gómez, vecino de Pozoblanco; Pedro Coronado, notario mayor y gobernador del Juzgado eclesiástico de Córdoba; Juan Díaz García, vecino de Lucena; y Antonio Luis Salcedo y Utrilla, labrador de Almodóvar del Río.
• Intendente: Joaquín de Peralta.

Se crea la institución ex novo, sin sede y sin personal, sin presupuesto y sin recursos propios, y lo que es más importante, sin medios coercitivos para el cumplimiento de sus funciones ante los ayuntamientos y autoridades de otras administraciones, primeras afectadas por la irrupción de la nueva institución provincial.

Las actas

Las actas de la DPC durante los ocho primeros meses de su existencia delatan los múltiples problemas que la aquejan: los ayuntamientos de los municipios no está preparados ni prevenidos de las nuevas normas, ni cuentan con el personal ni la preparación necesarias. La nueva recaudación provincial chocará con los muros de los ayuntamientos que no sabían o no querían entender las nuevas directrices. Las inversiones serán escasas, las cuentas poco claras.

Uno de los nuevos problemas será el reclutamiento y la llamada a filas de los soldados. La institución provincial tendrá un papel de mediador entre los ayuntamientos de su término y el Ejército, necesitado de hombres para la lucha contra el invasor.

Las nuevas elecciones ocuparán parte de las sesiones, así como los nombramientos de los Ayuntamientos. Los términos municipales y los repartos de propios y baldíos aparecerán frecuentemente en las páginas escritas de las actas.

Por último, la administración de Justicia incide también en el papel de la provincia, con casos de bandolerismo importantes y su incidencia en la seguridad ciudadana, asuntos que también tendrán cabida en la política de la institución.

Permanencia

Durante los ocho meses de existencia, la DPC mantiene cargos y presidencia. Si la Instrucción hablaba de la creación de una Junta de Sanidad en cada Ayuntamiento, compuesta por el alcalde primero, el cura párroco, el facultativo, más un regidor y un vecino del municipio, pudiendo los ayuntamientos renovarla o mantenerla cada año o ampliarla y nombrar nuevos miembros.

El regreso de Fernando VII y el fin del régimen constitucional se reflejó en Córdoba con la última acta de este periodo, fechada el 7 de mayo de 1814.

La Instrucción de 3 de febrero de 1823, para el Gobierno político-económico de las provincias vino a perfilar y cerrar debates sobre el significado de la primera Instrucción de 1813. La corta duración de su aplicación efectiva no será óbice para restar importancia a la misma.

En efecto, la Diputación de Córdoba dejó de funcionar con fecha 8 de junio de 1823.

El presidente ruso Vladimir Putin fue nombrado presidente de Rusia de manera interina el 31 de diciembre de 1999, tras la salida de Boris Yeltsin. Desde 2000 fue presidente electo durante dos períodos (2000–2004 y 2004–2008). Tras ejercer de primer ministro en el período 2012–2018 bajo la presidencia de Medvédev, pasó nuevamente a la presidencia de la Federación Rusa en los períodos 2018–2024 y 2024 hasta el presente. ^[4]​ Durante su presidencia ha pertenecido a los partidos Unidad y Rusia Unida, así como a la coalición Frente Popular, un grupo de partidarios que Putin organizó en 2011 para ayudar a mejorar la percepción pública de Rusia Unida. ^[5]​ A su doctrina política se le ha llamado Putinismo.

Putin ha disfrutado de altos índices de aprobación interna durante la mayor parte de su presidencia, con la excepción de 2011-2013, que probablemente se debe a las protestas rusas de 2011-2013. ^[6]​^[7]​ En 2007, fue la Persona del Año de la revista Time. ^[8]​ En 2015, fue designado número uno en Time 100, la lista de la revista Time de las 100 personas más influyentes del mundo. ^[9]​ De 2013 a 2016, fue designado número uno en la lista Forbes de las personas más poderosas del mundo. La economía y el nivel de vida rusos crecieron rápidamente durante el primer período del régimen de Putin, impulsados ​​en gran medida por un auge en la industria petrolera. Sin embargo, los precios más bajos del petróleo y las sanciones por la anexión de Crimea por parte de Rusia provocaron una recesión y un estancamiento en 2015 que ha persistido hasta el día de hoy. ^[10]​ Las libertades políticas se han visto drásticamente restringidas, en especial desde la Anexión de Crimea de 2015, lo que ha provocado una condena generalizada por parte de las organizaciones de derechos humanos -muchas de ellasprohibidas en el país; además desde 2022 y el inicio de la guerra Rusia-Ucrania, Putin ha sido descrito como un dictador. ^[11]​^[12]​^[13]​^[14]​^[15]​^[16]​^[17]​^[18]​^[19]​^[20]​^[21]​^[22]​^[23]​^[24]​

Se ha descrito el sistema político ruso bajo la presidencia de Putin como un sistema de liberalismo económico. La realidad es que el gobierno de la Federación rusa, lejos del liberalismo, ha practicado el proteccionismo y el paternalismo soviético, con una falta de transparencia en la gobernanza extrema, un creciente amiguismo y nepotismo en la gestión pública, dentro de un ambiente en el que la corrupción es algo generalizado. ^[25]​^[26]​^[27]​^[28]​^[29]​^[30]​

Entre 1999 y 2008, la economía rusa creció a un ritmo constante, ^[31]​ lo que algunos expertos atribuyen a la fuerte devaluación del rublo de 1998, las reformas estructurales de la era de Boris Yeltsin, el aumento de los precios del petróleo y el crédito barato de los bancos occidentales. ^[32]​^[33]​^[34]​ En opinión del ex embajador Michael McFaul (junio de 2004), el "impresionante" crecimiento económico a corto plazo de Rusia "vino simultáneamente con la destrucción de los medios de comunicación libres, amenazas a la sociedad civil y una corrupción absoluta de la justicia". ^[35]​

Durante los dos primeros mandatos de Putin como presidente, promulgó una serie de reformas económicas liberales, como el impuesto fijo sobre la renta del 13 por ciento, impuestos reducidos sobre las ganancias y nuevos códigos territoriales y civiles. Durante este período, la pobreza en Rusia se redujo a más de la mitad ^[36]​ y el PIB real creció rápidamente. ^[37]​ Sin embargo, el ex embajador Michael McFaul declaró en junio de 2004 que el "impresionante" crecimiento económico de Rusia "se produjo simultáneamente con la destrucción de los medios de comunicación libres, las amenazas a la sociedad civil y una corrupción absoluta de la justicia". ^[38]​^[39]​

En asuntos exteriores, el gobierno de Putin ha buscado emular la grandeza, la beligerancia y el expansionismo de la ex Unión Soviética. pueden estar creando ahora un mercado internacional para el putinismo" ya que "la mayoría de las veces, las elites nacionales instintivamente antidemocráticas, oligárquicas y corruptas encuentran que una apariencia de democracia, con adornos parlamentarios y una pretensión de pluralismo, es mucho más atractiva y manejable que la cosa real". ^[40]​

En un artículo publicado el 20 de septiembre de 2007 en The Washington Times, el economista estadounidense Richard W. Rahn calificó el putinismo como "una forma de gobierno nacionalista autoritaria rusa que pretende ser una democracia de libre mercado" y que "debe más de su linaje al fascismo que al comunismo". ", señalando que "el putinismo dependía de que la economía rusa creciera lo suficientemente rápido como para que la mayoría de la gente tuviera un nivel de vida cada vez mayor y, a cambio, estuviera dispuesta a soportar la suave represión existente". La suerte cambió, era probable que el putinismo se volviera más represivo". ^[41]​ He predicted that "as Russia's economic fortunes changed, Putinism was likely to become more repressive".^[41]​ Tras los comentarios de Rahn, Putin aceleró sus medidas autoritarias, promoviendo creencias y valores conservadores y silenciando sistemáticamente a los sectores de la oposición política dentro y fuera de la administración. ^[42]​

El historiador ruso Andranik Migranyan consideró que el régimen de Putin estaba restaurando lo que él consideraba las funciones naturales de un gobierno después del período de la década de 1990, cuando supuestamente gobernaban Rusia oligopolios que expresaban sólo sus propios intereses estrechos. Migranyan dijo: "Si la democracia es el gobierno de una mayoría y la protección de los derechos y oportunidades de una minoría, el régimen político actual puede describirse como democrático, al menos formalmente. En Rusia existe un sistema político multipartidista, mientras que varios partidos, la mayoría de ellos, que representan a la oposición, tienen escaños en la Duma del Estado". ^[43]​

En un artículo publicado el 11 de enero de 2000 en Sovetskaya Rossiya, el analista político ruso Andrey Piontkovsky caracterizó el putinismo como la etapa más alta y final del capitalismo de bandidos en Rusia, la etapa en la que, como dijo Lenin, la burguesía tira por la borda la bandera de las libertades democráticas y los derechos humanos; y también como una guerra, la «consolidación» de la nación sobre la base del odio contra algún grupo étnico, el ataque a la libertad de expresión, el lavado de cerebro informativo, el aislamiento del mundo exterior y una mayor degradación económica. ^[44]​ Fue el primer uso registrado del término «putinismo». ^[45]​

Los términos «putinismo» y «putinista» suelen tener connotaciones negativas cuando se utilizan en los medios de comunicación occidentales ^[46]​^[47]​^[48]​^[49]​^[50]​^[51]​ para referirse al gobierno ruso de Putin, en el que los llamados "siloviki", el estamento militar y de seguridad, supuestamente controlan gran parte del poder político y financiero. Muchos siloviki^[52]​^[53]​ son amigos personales de Putin o trabajaron anteriormente con él en agencias de seguridad e inteligencia del Estado, como el FSB, el Ministerio del Interior y el ejército. ^[54]​^[55]​^[56]​^[57]​^[58]​^[59]​^[60]​ Cassiday y Johnson afirman que, desde su llegada al poder en 1999, «Putin ha inspirado expresiones de adulación como Rusia no había visto desde los tiempos de José Stalin. Los homenajes a sus logros y atributos personales han inundado todos los medios de comunicación posibles" Ross afirma que el culto surgió rápidamente en 2002 y hace hincapié en la “voluntad de hierro, salud, juventud y decisión” de Putin. ^[61]​^[62]​

VER: Putin's rise to power

El 31 de diciembre de 1999, sorpresivamente el presidente Boris Yeltsin dimitió. En virtud de la Constitución de Rusia, el primer ministro se convirtió en Presidente en funciones. ^[63]​ No por casualidad, un día antes apareció en la página web del gobierno ruso un artículo firmado por Vladimir Putin titulado «Rusia en el cambio de milenio». El primer ministro daba su opinión sobre el pasado y planteaba los principales problemas del país. En opinión de Putin, la primera tarea era la consolidación de la sociedad rusa: «El trabajo fructífero y creativo, que tanto necesita nuestro país, es imposible en una sociedad dividida y atomizada internamente". ^[64]​ Sin embargo, subrayó: «En una Rusia democrática no debe haber acuerdos civiles forzados. El acuerdo social sólo puede ser voluntario". ^[64]​ La clave no era otra que reforzar el Estado: «La clave para la recuperación y el crecimiento de Rusia reside hoy en la esfera político-estatal. Rusia necesita un poder estatal fuerte y debe tenerlo». Y añadió: «Un poder estatal fuerte en Rusia es un Estado federal democrático, basado en la ley y viable". ^[64]​ Además, Putin señaló la necesidad de mejorar significativamente la eficiencia económica, la necesidad de llevar a cabo una política social coherente basada en hechos y resultados y destinada a luchar contra la pobreza, y la necesidad de proporcionar un crecimiento estable para el bienestar de la población. ^[64]​

El artículo concluía con la afirmación alarmista de que Rusia se encontraba en medio de uno de los periodos más difíciles de su historia: «Por primera vez en los últimos 200-300 años, se enfrenta a la amenaza real de descender al segundo, y posiblemente incluso al tercer, rango de los estados del mundo". ^[64]​ Para evitarlo, argumentaba que era necesario un tremendo esfuerzo por parte de todas las fuerzas intelectuales, físicas y morales de la nación porque “todo depende de nosotros, y sólo de nosotros, de nuestra capacidad para reconocer la magnitud de la amenaza, para unirnos y aplicarnos a un trabajo largo y duro”. ^[64]​

Como se afirma en el curso de historia de los doctores rusos en Historia Barsenkov y Vdovin, las ideas básicas del artículo estaban representadas en el programa electoral de Vladímir Putin y contaban con el apoyo de la mayoría de los ciudadanos del país, lo que condujo a la victoria de Vladímir Putin en la primera vuelta de las elecciones de 2000, con el 52% de los votos emitidos. ^[65]​

VER Mikhail Kasyanov's Cabinet

Las líneas maestras de la política exterior rusa fueron presentadas por Vladimir Putin en su discurso ante la Asamblea Federal de Rusia en abril de 2002: «Estamos construyendo relaciones constructivas y normales con todas las naciones del mundo, quiero subrayar, con todas las naciones del mundo. Sin embargo, quiero señalar algo más: la norma en la comunidad internacional, en el mundo de hoy, es también la dura competencia: por los mercados, por las inversiones, por la influencia política y económica. Y en esta lucha, Rusia tiene que ser fuerte y competitiva». «Quiero subrayar que la política exterior rusa se organizará en el futuro de forma estrictamente pragmática, basándose en nuestras capacidades e intereses nacionales: militares y estratégicos, económicos y políticos. Y también teniendo en cuenta los intereses de nuestros socios, sobre todo en la CEI».^[66]​

En su libro de 2008, el comentarista político ruso, teniente general retirado del KGB [Nikolai Leonov]], señaló que el artículo sobre el programa de Putin apenas se tuvo en cuenta entonces y nunca se volvió a tratar después, un hecho que Leonov lamentó, porque «su contenido es muy importante para contrastarlo con sus acciones posteriores [de Putin]» y así averiguar el patrón de Putin, según el cual «las palabras, la mayoría de las veces, no coinciden con sus acciones». ^[67]​

El concepto de «putinismo» fue descrito en sentido positivo por el politólogo ruso Andranik Migranyan. ^[43]​ Según Migranyan, Putin llegó al cargo cuando peor estaba el régimen: la economía estaba «totalmente descentralizada» y «el Estado había perdido la autoridad central mientras los oligarcas robaban el país y controlaban sus instituciones de poder». En dos años, Putin restauró la jerarquía del poder, acabando con la omnipotencia de las élites regionales y destruyendo la influencia política de «oligarcas y oligopolios en el centro federal». El centro de poder no institucional de la era de Boris Yeltsin, comúnmente llamado «La Familia», quedó arruinado, lo que según Migranyan socavó a su vez las posiciones de actores como Boris Berezovsky y Vladimir Gusinsky, que habían intentado privatizar el Estado ruso «con todos sus recursos e instituciones». ^[43]​

Migranyan afirmó que Putin empezó a establecer reglas de juego comunes para todos los actores, empezando por un intento de restaurar el papel del gobierno como institución que expresa los intereses conjuntos de los ciudadanos y «capaz de controlar los recursos financieros, administrativos y mediáticos del Estado». Según Migranyan: «Naturalmente, de acuerdo con las tradiciones rusas, cualquier intento de aumentar el papel del Estado provoca una intensa repulsa por parte de los intelectuales liberales, por no mencionar a un segmento de la comunidad empresarial que no está interesado en el fortalecimiento del poder estatal hasta que no se haya apoderado de toda la propiedad estatal más atractiva». Migranyan afirmó que la opinión de los oligopolios sobre la democracia se basaba en la premisa de si estaban cerca del centro del poder, y no en «características y estimaciones objetivas de la situación del país». Migranyan afirmó que los medios de comunicación «libres», propiedad de, por ejemplo, Berezovsky y Gusinsky, no se parecían en nada a los medios libres tal y como los entiende Occidente, sino que servían a sus propios intereses económicos y políticos, mientras que «al resto de políticos y analistas se les negaba el derecho a salir en antena». ^[43]​ Migranyan considera que el refuerzo del papel de las fuerzas del orden es una prueba para poner barreras a los delincuentes, «sobre todo a los de las grandes empresas». ^[43]​ Migranyan ve en 2004 la fructificación de la revolución social iniciada por Mijail Gorbachov, cuyos objetivos eran reconstruir el sistema social, afirmando que «el dominio absoluto de la propiedad privada en Rusia, reconocido hoy por todas las fuerzas políticas, ha sido el mayor logro y resultado de esta revolución social». ^[43]​ Según Migranyan, el principal problema de la democracia rusa es la incapacidad de su sociedad civil para gobernar el Estado y el subdesarrollo de los intereses públicos. En su opinión, esto es consecuencia de la incapacidad del Estado familiar de la era Yeltsin de crear «un entorno favorable para las medianas y pequeñas empresas». Migranyan considera que la Rusia moderna es una democracia, al menos formalmente, mientras que «el Estado, una vez restaurada su eficacia y el control sobre sus propios recursos, se ha convertido en la mayor corporación responsable de establecer las reglas del juego». Migranyan se pregunta hasta dónde puede llegar esta influencia en el futuro. En 2004, veía dos posibilidades para el régimen de Putin: o la transformación en una democracia consolidada, o el autoritarismo burocrático. Sin embargo, «si Rusia va por detrás de las naciones capitalistas desarrolladas en lo que respecta a la consolidación de la democracia, no es por la calidad de la democracia, sino por su cantidad y por el equilibrio entre la sociedad civil y el Estado». ^[43]​

El informe de Andrew C. Kuchins de noviembre de 2007 afirmaba que «Rusia es hoy un régimen híbrido que podría calificarse mejor de “internacionalismo antiliberal”, aunque ninguna de las dos palabras es del todo exacta y requiere considerables matizaciones. De ser una protodemocracia débilmente institucionalizada, frágil y distorsionada en muchos aspectos en la década de 1990, Rusia bajo Vladimir Putin ha retrocedido en la dirección de un autoritarismo altamente centralizado, que ha caracterizado al Estado durante la mayor parte de sus 1.000 años de historia. Pero se trata de un Estado autoritario en el que el consentimiento de los gobernados es esencial. Dada la experiencia de la década de 1990 y la propaganda del Kremlin que enfatiza este período como uno de caos, colapso económico y humillación internacional, el pueblo ruso no tiene un gran entusiasmo por la democracia y sigue siendo políticamente apático a la luz de la extraordinaria recuperación económica y la mejora en el estilo de vida de tantas personas en los últimos ocho años. El gobierno emergente, altamente centralizado, combinado con una sociedad débil y sumisa, es el sello distintivo del paternalismo tradicional ruso». ^[68]​

En una entrevista concedida en 2007 a Der Spiegel, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn comentó sobre el régimen de Putin: «Putin ha heredado un país saqueado y oprimido, con una mayoría de su población desmoralizada y pobre. Comprendió y gestionó lo que era posible: una recuperación gradual y lenta. Estos esfuerzos no se notaron ni se apreciaron inmediatamente. En cualquier caso, es difícil encontrar ejemplos en la historia en los que las medidas de un país para recuperar la fuerza de su propio gobierno sean acogidas favorablemente por otros gobiernos». ^[69]​

Según un artículo de 2007 de Dimitri Simes, aparecido en la revista Foreign Affairs: «Con altos precios de la energía, políticas fiscales sólidas y oligarcas domesticados, el régimen de Putin ya no necesita préstamos internacionales ni ayuda económica y no tiene problemas para atraer importantes inversiones extranjeras a pesar de la creciente tensión con los gobiernos occidentales. Dentro de Rusia, la relativa estabilidad, la prosperidad y un nuevo sentido de la dignidad han atemperado la desilusión popular ante el creciente control estatal y la manipulación de mano dura del proceso político». ^[70]​

La corresponsal diplomática de la BBC Bridget Kendall describía en su artículo de 2007 la «década marcada» de los noventa en Rusia, con una «hiperinflación galopante», duras políticas de Yeltsin, un descenso de la población a un ritmo similar al de una nación en guerra, y el país pasando «de superpotencia a mendigo», para preguntarse a continuación: «Así pues, ¿quién puede culpar a los rusos por acoger con satisfacción la relativa estabilidad que Putin ha presidido durante los últimos siete años, aunque otros aspectos de su gobierno hayan proyectado una sombra autoritaria? En el mundo de la política rusa, lo que muchos temen no es que haya poca democracia, sino que haya demasiada. Por eso, según descubrí, algunos piden que Putin siga un tercer mandato. No porque le admiren -en privado, muchos dicen que él y sus compinches son tan corruptos y desprecian a los demás como sus predecesores comunistas-, sino porque desconfían de la idea de democracia, están resentidos con Occidente por impulsarla y temen lo que pueda ocurrir como resultado de las elecciones del próximo año. La experiencia reciente les ha enseñado que el cambio suele ser para peor y que es mejor evitarlo». ^[71]​

Según Mark Smith (marzo de 2003), entre los principales caracteres del régimen de Putin hasta ese momento el más importante fue el desarrollo de un sistema corporativo mediante la búsqueda de estrechos vínculos con las organizaciones empresariales, la estabilidad social y la cooptación de los partidos de la oposición. ^[72]​ Determinó tres agrupaciones principales en el liderazgo inicial de Putin: 1) los siloviki, 2) los liberales económicos y 3) los partidarios de «la Familia», es decir, los cercanos a Yeltsin. ^[72]​

Olga Kryshtanovskaya, que realizó un estudio sociológico en 2004, cifró en un 25% el número relativo de siloviki en la élite política rusa. ^[52]​ En el «círculo íntimo» de Putin, formado por unas 20 personas, el porcentaje de siloviki aumenta hasta el 58% y se reduce al 18-20% en el Parlamento y al 34% en el conjunto del Gobierno. ^[52]​ Según Kryshtanovskaya, no hubo una toma del poder como la burocracia del Kremlin ha llamado a los siloviki para «restablecer el orden». El proceso de llegada al poder de los siloviki comenzó supuestamente en 1996, durante el segundo mandato de Borís Yeltsin. «No personalmente Yeltsin, sino toda la élite deseaba detener el proceso revolucionario y consolidar el poder». Cuando Putin fue nombrado Primer Ministro en 1999, el proceso se vio impulsado. Según Olga: «Sí, Putin ha traído consigo a los silovikis. Pero eso no basta para entender la situación. También hay un aspecto objetivo: toda la clase política deseaba que vinieran. Fueron llamados al servicio... Se necesitaba un brazo fuerte, capaz desde el punto de vista de la élite de establecer el orden en el país». ^[52]​

Kryshtanovskaya señaló que también había personas que habían trabajado en estructuras que se creía que estaban afiliadas al KGB/FSB, como el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la Unión Soviética, la Comisión Gubernamental de Comunicaciones, el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, la agencia de prensa News y otras. El trabajo per se en tales agencias no implicaría necesariamente contactos con los servicios de seguridad, pero sí los haría probables. ^[73]​ Sumando las cifras de los «siloviki» oficiales y afiliados, llegó a una estimación del 77% de los mismos en el poder. ^[52]​

Según una investigación de la Fundación Rusa de Opinión Pública de 2005, el 34% de los encuestados piensa que «hay falta de democracia en Rusia porque no se respetan los derechos y libertades democráticos», y también señalaron la falta de ley y orden. Al mismo tiempo, el 21% de los encuestados dijo que había demasiada democracia en Rusia, y muchos de ellos señalaron los mismos inconvenientes que el grupo anterior: «[L]a falta de ley y orden, la irresponsabilidad y la no rendición de cuentas de los políticos». Según la Fundación: «Como vemos, las opiniones negativas de los rusos sobre la democracia se basan en su insatisfacción con las condiciones contemporáneas, mientras que algunos encuestados piensan que el modelo democrático no es adecuado en principio». Considerando el régimen moderno: «Es interesante que la mayoría de los encuestados piense que el gobierno de Putin marca la época más democrática de la historia rusa (29%), mientras que el segundo lugar lo ocupa la época de Brézhnev (14%). Algunos mencionan a Gorbachov y Yeltsin en este contexto (11% y 9%, respectivamente)». ^[74]​ A finales de 2008, Lev Gudkov, basándose en los datos de las encuestas del Levada Center, señaló la casi desaparición de la opinión pública como institución sociopolítica en la Rusia de Putin y su sustitución por la todavía eficaz propaganda estatal. ^[75]​

La operación de cambio de poder entre Putin y Medvédev en 2008 se consideró en general una acción pro forma después de que la Constitución no permitiera a Putin ser reelegido para un tercer mandato en las elecciones presidenciales de 2008.

Según un estudio de Olesya Zakharova, investigadora del Higher School of Economics y del Centro de Investigación de Estudios de Europa Oriental de la Universidad de Bremen, tras las protestas de 2011-2013 en la plaza Bolotnaya, que fueron descritas en el discurso oficial ruso como un abuso de las libertades democráticas y graves amenazas para la seguridad de los ciudadanos, Putin presentó un nuevo concepto de «democracia rusa», que interpretó exclusivamente como «cumplimiento y respeto de las leyes, normas y reglamentos», y que las libertades individuales y los derechos humanos ya no se consideraban requisitos previos para una sociedad democrática. ^[76]​

Las leyes rusas se modificaron de acuerdo con este nuevo concepto de «democracia». Según un estudio realizado por la Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos (en inglés: International Federation for Human Rights), en el periodo 2012-2018 se aprobaron en Rusia unas 50 leyes antidemocráticas. ^[77]​ Las nuevas leyes y normativas van desde mayores poderes de vigilancia y censura, pasando por leyes que prohíben «cuestionar la integridad de la nación rusa» -prohibiendo de hecho criticar la presencia de Rusia en el este de Ucrania y Crimea-, amplias leyes sobre «extremismo» que otorgan a las autoridades poderes para reprimir la libertad política y religiosa, hasta imponer determinadas visiones sobre la historia rusa prohibiendo a la gente pensar de forma diferente. A lo largo de estos últimos años también se ha elaborado un conjunto específico y complejo de leyes para dificultar a las ONG y a las organizaciones de derechos humanos el funcionamiento y la comunicación de sus actividades, el acceso a la información y la recepción de financiación internacional, obstaculizando así gravemente su capacidad para operar de forma independiente y, en el caso de las más pequeñas, para sobrevivir. ^[78]​

On 21 November 2012, the Federal Law of 20 July 2012 No.121-FZ "On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent",^[79]​ which is the amendments to the Federal Law of 19 May 1995 No.82-FZ "On public associations", the Federal Law of 12 January 1996 No.7-FZ "On Non-profit Organizations", the Federal Law of 7 August 2001 No.115-FZ "On countering the legalization (laundering) of the proceeds of crime and the financing of terrorism", the Criminal Code of Russia and the Criminal Procedure Code of Russia, entered into force.^[80]​ In accordance to this law, Russian non-profit organization, except for state and municipal companies, can be declared foreign agent if it participates in political activity in Russia and receives funding from foreign sources. Political activity is defined as any influence to public opinion and public policy including a sending a requests and petitions. The foreign agent label increases registration barriers for a non-profit organization in Russia. Once registered, non-profit organizations are subject to additional audits and are obliged to mark all their official statements with a disclosure that it is being given by a "foreign agent". This includes restrictions on foreigners and stateless peoples from establishing or even participating in the organization. Supervisory powers are allowed to intervene and interrupt the internal affairs of the NGO with suspensions for up to six months.

On 1 January 2013, the Federal Law of 28 December 2012 No.272-FZ "On Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation"^[81]​ (also known as Dima Yakovlev Law or Law of Scoundrels) entered into force.^[82]​ It creates a list of citizens who are banned from entering Russia, and also allows the government to freeze their assets and investments. The law suspends the activity of politically active non-profit organizations which receive money from American citizens or organizations. It also bans citizens of the United States from adopting children from Russia. This law was adopted as the answer to American Magnitsky Act.

On 3 June 2015, the amendments to the Federal Law of 28 December 2012 No.272-FZ "On Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation", contained in the Federal Law of 23 May 2015, No.129-FZ "On amendments of some legislative acts of the Russian Federation",^[83]​ entered into force.^[84]​ These amendments give Prosecutor-General of Russia the power to extrajudicially declare foreign and international organizations "undesirable" in Russia and shut them down. There is no procedure for appeals. Organizations that do not disband when given notice to do so, as well as Russians who maintain ties to them, are subject to high fines and significant jail time. The law provides only one ground for recognizing organization as "undesirable" – "a threat to the fundamental principles of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, defence capability of country or state security".

On 13 June 2016, the opinion of the Venice Commission on Russian undesirable organizations law^[85]​ was published. According to the Venice Commission conclusion, Russian undesirable organizations law consists the vague definition of certain fundamental concepts, such as "non-governmental organisations", grounds on the basis of which the activities of a foreign or international NGO may be declared undesirable, "directing of" and "participating in" the activities of a listed NGO, coupled with the wide discretion granted to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the lack of specific judicial guarantees in the Federal Law, contradicts the principle of legality. The automatic legal consequences (blanket prohibitions) imposed upon NGOs whose activities are declared undesirable (prohibition to organise and conduct mass actions and public events or to distribute information materials) may only be acceptable in extreme cases of NGOs constituting serious threat to the security of the state or to fundamental democratic principles. In other instances, the blanket application of these sanctions might contradict the requirement under the European Convention on Human Rights that the interference with the freedom of association and assembly has to respond to a pressing social need and has to be proportional to the legitimate aim pursued. Furthermore, the inclusion of an NGO in the List should be made on the basis of clear and detailed criteria following a judicial decision or at least, the decision should be subject to an appropriate judicial appeal.

On 25 November 2017, the amendments, contained in the Federal Law of 25 November 2017 No.327-FZ "On Amendments to the articles 10.4 and 15.3 of the Federal Law "On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection" and to the article 6 of the Russian Federation Law "On the media"",^[86]​ entered into force.^[87]​ In accordance to these amendments, any foreign juridical person distributing printed, audio or audio-visual materials can be declared a foreign media performing the functions of a "foreign agent" even if such juridical person does not have branches or representative offices in Russia. Foreign juridical persons declared a foreign media performing the functions of a "foreign agent" are obliged the Russian foreign agent law.

On 2 December 2019, the amendments, contained in the Federal Law of 2 December 2019 No.426-FZ "On Amendments to the Russian Federation Law "On the media" and the Federal Law "On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection"",^[88]​ entered into force.^[89]​ In accordance to these amendments, foreign juridical persons declared a foreign media performing the functions of a "foreign agent" must form a Russian juridical person and inform Russian authorities about this. Also these amendments provided the possibility to designate natural person as "foreign agent" – this requires that natural person distributes a materials of a foreign media performing functions of a "foreign agent" (for example, in social media) and receive funding from foreign sources (for example, salary from international company).^[90]​^[91]​

On 30 December 2020, the amendments, contained in the Federal Law of 30 December 2020 No.481-FZ "On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Establishment Additional Measures to Counter the Threats to National Security",^[92]​ entered into force.^[93]​ In accordance to these amendments, special marking are envisaged not only for a publications of non-profit organizations declared a "foreign agent" but also for a publications of its founders, heads, members, employees. Individuals (Russian citizens, foreign citizens and stateless persons) also can be declared "foreign agent" for their political activity. Political activity is defined as any influence to public opinion including publications in social media and public policy including a sending a requests and petitions. The publications of individuals declared "foreign agent" also must be marked. Individuals declared "foreign agent" are obliged to make special reporting and are deprived of the right to hold public office.

The articles 13.15, 19.7.5-2, 19.7.5-3, 19.7.5-4, 19.34, 19.34.1, 20.28 of the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses establish liability providing for substantial fines for violating Russian foreign agent law. The article 330.1 of the Criminal Code of Russia establish criminal liability providing for imprisonment for up to 5 years and compulsory labour for violating Russian foreign agent law.^[94]​ The article 20.33 of the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses establish liability providing for substantial fines for violating Russian undesirable organizations law. The article 284.1 of the Criminal Code of Russia establish criminal liability providing for imprisonment for up to 6 years and compulsory labour for violating Russian undesirable organizations law.^[95]​

In January 2020, Putin proposed a number of substantial amendments to the Constitution of Russia. To introduce these amendments, he held a referendum. They were approved on 1 July 2020 by a contested popular vote. The amendments had wide reaching impacts, including extending Presidential term limits, allowing the President to fire federal judges, and constitutionally banning same-sex marriage.^[96]​

With Putin's signing a decree on 3 July 2020 to officially insert the amendments into the Russian Constitution, they took effect on 4 July 2020.^[97]​

The Venice Commission concluded that the amendments have disproportionately strengthened the position of the President of the Russian Federation and have done away with some of the checks and balances originally foreseen in the Constitution, taken together, these changes go far beyond what is appropriate under the principle of separation of powers, even in presidential regimes, and the speed of the preparation of such wide-ranging amendments was clearly inappropriate for the depth of the amendments considering their societal impact.^[98]​

Protests in Russia began on 23 January 2021 in support of opposition leader Alexei Navalny who was detained upon his arrival at Sheremetyevo Airport after treatment and rehabilitation in Germany. On the first day, protests were held in 198 towns and cities across Russia. On 31 January, more than 4000 protesters were detained which is the record number in Russia's post-Soviet history.^[99]​

On 2 February, Navalny's suspended sentence of three and a half years was replaced with a prison sentence. In March, his team launched a campaign demanding for his freedom, with protests planned after 500,000 people pledge to participate. On 21 April 2021, there was another mass protest. Subsequently, Russian authorities identified participants of the protest using public video surveillance and facial recognition system and initiated proceedings against them; many protesters were dismissed from their jobs and were expelled from universities.^[100]​

On 9 June 2021, Vyacheslav Polyga, judge of Moscow City Court, upheld the administrative claim of the prosecutor of Moscow city Denis Popov and decided^[101]​ to recognize Anti-Corruption Foundation, Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation and Alexei Navalny staff as extremist organizations, to liquidate Anti-Corruption Foundation, Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation and confiscate their assets, to prohibit the activity of Alexei Navalny staff (case No.3а-1573/2021).^[102]​ Case hearing was held in camera because, as indicated by advocate Ilia Novikov, the case file including the text of the administrative claim was classified as state secret.^[103]​ According to advocate Ivan Pavlov, Alexei Navalny was not the party to the proceedings and the judge refused to give him such status; at the hearing, the prosecutor stated that defendants are extremist organizations because they want the change of power in Russia and they promised to help participants of the protest with payment of administrative and criminal fines and with making a complaints to the European Court of Human Rights.^[104]​^[105]​ On 4 August 2021, First Appellate Ordinary Court located in Moscow upheld the decision of the court of first instance (case No.66а-3553/2021) and this decision entered into force that day.^[106]​ On 28 December 2021, it was reported that Anti-Corruption Foundation, Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation and 18 natural persons including Alexei Navalny filed a cassation appeals to the Second Cassation Ordinary Court.^[107]​ On 25 March 2022, the Second Cassation Ordinary Court rejected all cassation appeals and upheld the judgements of lower courts (case No.8а-5101/2022).^[108]​

In the opinion of Vladimir Pastukhov, political scientist, Russian advocate and honorary senior research associate of University College London School of Slavonic and East European Studies, after amendments to the Constitution of Russia, the phase transition had happened – Russia had transformed from authoritarian dictatorship into totalitarian tyranny. This transition is due to the convergence of two factors: the completion of establishment of the repressive infrastructure and the creation of ersatz ideology which is the eclectic set composed of such elements as paternalistic autocracy (tsarism), communism, Pan-Slavism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Eurasianism, right-wing populism, left-wing populism, cult of victory in Great Patriotic War, anti-Americanism, imperialism, xenophobia, Russian messianism, versailles syndrome and revanchism. The transformation into totalitarian state is reflected in the transition from selective repressions against opposition politicians and political activists who struggle for power to mass repressions against dissidents and potentially disloyal citizens who just do not want to support Putin's regime.^[109]​

The poisoning of Dmitry Bykov, writer, poet and literary critic who criticized Putin's regime,^[110]​ the criminal proceedings against Ivan Pavlov, advocate who defended persons accused of treason and extremism,^[111]​ and Denis Karagodin, philosopher who has been digging into archives to find out the truth about his great-grandfather murder during Stalin's Great Purge,^[112]​ and the pressure against numerous independent journalists became the signs of new times.

On 4 June 2021, the amendments, contained in Federal Law of 4 June 2021, No.157-FZ, entered into force. According to these amendments, any person who was a founder, a head, a member, an employee of the organization recognized as extremist or terrorist or just who donated this organization or expressed support for this organization (in writing or orally) is deprived of the right to stand for election. This legal provision has retroactive effect because it includes the case where a person carried out relevant activity before the organization was recognized as extremist or terrorist, nevertheless, such person is deprived of passive suffrage.^[113]​ Furthermore, under Article 282.2 of the Criminal Code of Russia the participation in the activity of extremist organization carries a sentence of between 2 and 6 years' imprisonment for ordinary participants and between 6 and 10 years' imprisonment for founders and heads of such organization. And reigning approach in Russian law enforcement practice is that the former participant of the organization, recognized as extremist and liquidated by court decision, is considered as a person who continues the activity of such organization in the event he is the participant new organization even if these organizations have different statutes and objectives (many activists were convicted in Putin's Russia precisely in accordance with this approach, for example, the members of group supporting the referendum "For responsible authority!"^[114]​ and the members of organization "People's Militia of Russia"^[115]​). So, the convergence of aforementioned approach in law enforcement practice and new law establishes the legal framework for subsequent political repressions of people who participated or supported the organizations recognized as extremist and liquidated by court decision even if such people's actions occurred prior to the date of court decision.

In Golos assessment, at least 9 million people have been deprived of the right to stand for election in Russia.^[117]​

On 6 July 2021, the opinion of the Venice Commission on Russian foreign agent law [1] was published.^[118]​ According to the Venice Commission conclusion, Russian foreign agent law constitutes serious violations of basic human rights, including the freedoms of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs, as well as the prohibition of discrimination. The Venice Commission is particularly concerned by the combined effect of the most recent amendments on entities, individuals, the media and civil society more broadly. The combined effect of the recent reforms enables authorities to exercise significant control over the activities and existence of associations as well as over the participation of individuals in civic life.

On 1 June 2021, the Federal Law of 5 April 2021 No.85-FZ "On Amendments to the Federal Law "About education in Russian Federation""^[119]​ entered into force.^[120]​ This law establishes the concept of the outreach activity: it is the activity, carrying out outside educational programs, which aims to dissemination of a knowledge and an experience, to formation of a skills, a values, and a competence, in order to intellectual, spiritual and moral, creative, physical, and (or) professional development of individual, and to meet educational needs of individual. The manner, conditions and implementation modalities of outreach activity and also the procedure for the control of such activity are regulated by the Government of Russia. Outreach activity can be carried out by public and local authorities and natural and juridical persons concluded a contracts with educational institutions in the order determined by the Government of Russia. Although the Russian Academy of Sciences and numerous cultural and educational societies opposed the bill,^[121]​^[122]​^[123]​ it was adopted by the State Duma, approved by the Federation Council and signed by President Putin.^[124]​ According to scientists, science popularizers, educationalists, lawyers, this law, in fact, establishes the prior censorship of virtually every ways to share knowledge and conviction, contrary to the articles 19 and 29 of the Constitution of Russia.^[125]​^[126]​^[127]​ According to the authors, the law aims to shield Russian citizens against anti-Russian propaganda.^[128]​^[129]​

On 9 May 2000, the newspaper Kommersant had published the document called «Revision number Six», which was the reform project of Presidential Administration. Before the text of the document, editor-in-chief wrote: «the fact that such program is being developing is very important it is in itself ... if this will be a reality, almost of the entire population of Russia – from politicians and governors to ordinary voters – will be under surveillance by secret services».^[130]​ This document was published again in 2010.^[131]​

Furthemore, on 9 May 2000, the newspaper Kommersant had published an article by deputy editor-in-chief Veronika Kutsyllo, according to which the text of «Revision number Six» had been provided to journalists by anonymous employee of the Presidential Administration; Putin was mentioned in the text of this document as acting president and the attached charts, totalling more than 100 pages, were drawn up before 1999 Russian legislative election, and these facts created the reason to believe that the work on this document started long before 2000 Russian presidential election.^[132]​

The authors of "Revision number Six" stated that Russian social and political system at the time was self-regulatory that was totally unacceptable to Putin who wished that all social and political processes in Russia were completely managed by one single body. The Presidential Administration and, more specifically, its Domestic Policy Directorate was to be such body.

The authors of «Revision number Six» rejected the possibility of direct prohibition on opposition activities and independent mass media activities considering that Russian society was not ready for that, and it was the reason, they proposed that Domestic Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration uses the combination of public and secret activities. Secret activities were to be carried out with the direct use of special services, in particular, Federal Security Service.^[133]​ The main objective of such secret activity was to take control over activity of political parties, community and political leaders, governors, legislatures, candidates for elective positions, election commissions and election officials, mass media and journalists. To achieve this objective, the following tasks were set: 1) the collection information (including dirt) about individuals and organizations of interests and the pressure on them; 2) the creation of conditions under which independent mass media cannot operate; 3) taking control over elections to ensure the victories of pro-Kremlin candidates; 4) the establishment of civil society organizations which are ostensibly independent but actually are under the full control of the Kremlin; 5) the discredit the opposition and the creation of the informational and political barrier around Putin (good things happen thanks to Putin personally but bad officials are responsible for bad things and not Putin; Putin does not respond to opposition's charge and does not participate in debates – others do that for him).

According to Vasily Gatov, the analyst of Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California, the realizations of the provisions of «Revision number Six» means building the state where democratic institutions exist nominally but in reality these institutions are fully controlled by Presidential Administration and secret police.^[134]​ He characterized such regime as «counterintelligence state» (one of the kinds of guided democracy).^[135]​^[136]​

On 7 May 2016, the newspaper Kommersant had published an article by Ilya Barabanov and Gleb Cherkasov containing an analysis of the implementation of provisions of «Revision number Six». They concluded that, although the authors of «Revision number Six» had not taken into account some things (for example, authors of the aforementioned document denied the need for creation of pro-Kremlin political party, which actually was established subsequently), by and large, the provisions of «Revision number Six» were conducted.^[137]​

Russian politician Boris Nemtsov and commentator Vladimir Kara-Murza define Putinism in Russia as "a one party system, censorship, a puppet parliament, ending of an independent judiciary, firm centralization of power and finances, and hypertrophied role of special services and bureaucracy, in particular in relation to business".^[138]​

Russia's nascent middle class showed few signs of political activism under the regime as Masha Lipman reported: "As with the majority overall, those in the middle-income group have accepted the paternalism of Vladimir Putin's government and remained apolitical and apathetic".^[139]​

In December 2007, the Russian sociologist Igor Eidman (VCIOM) categorized the Putin regime as "the power of bureaucratic oligarchy" which had "the traits of extreme right-wing dictatorship — the dominance of state-monopoly capital in the economy, silovoki structures in governance, clericalism and statism in ideology".^[140]​

In August 2008, The Economist wrote about the virtual demise of both Russian and Soviet intelligentsia in post-Soviet Russia and noted: "Putinism was made strong by the absence of resistance from the part of society that was meant to provide intellectual opposition".^[141]​ In early February 2009, Aleksander Auzan, an economist and board member at a research institute set up by Dmitry Medvedev, said that in the Putin system "there is not a relationship between the authorities and the people through Parliament or through nonprofit organizations or other structures. The relationship to the people is basically through television. And under the conditions of the crisis, that can no longer work".^[142]​ About the same time, Vladimir Ryzhkov pointed out that a bill Medvedev had sent to the State Duma in late January 2009, when signed into law, will allow Kremlin-friendly regional legislatures to remove opposition mayors who were elected by popular vote: "It is no coincidence that Medvedev has taken aim at the country's mayors. Mayoral elections were the last bastion of direct elections after the Duma cancelled the popular vote for governors in 2005. Independent mayors were the only source of political competition against governors who were loyal to the Kremlin and United Russia. Now one of the few remaining checks and balances against the monopoly on executive power in the regions will be removed. After the law is signed by Medvedev, the power vertical will be extended one step further to reach every mayor in the country".^[143]​

On 9 July 2020, the popular governor of the Khabarovsk Krai, Sergei Furgal, who defeated the candidate of Putin's United Russia party in elections two years ago, was detained and flown to Moscow. Furgal was arrested 15 years after the alleged crimes he is accused of. Every day since June 11, mass protests have been held in the Khabarovsk Krai in support of Furgal.^[144]​ The protests included anti-Kremlin slogans like "Putin resign", "Twenty years, no trust", or "Away with Putin!".^[145]​^[146]​

On 7 April 2022, Russia was suspended from the United Nations Human Rights Council over reports of "gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights" after 93 members voted in favor.^[147]​

On 1 March 2022, Russian authorities blocked access to Echo of Moscow and TV Rain,^[148]​ Russia's last independent TV station.^[149]​

On 4 March 2022, Putin signed into law a bill introducing prison sentences of up to 15 years for those who publish "knowingly false information" about the Russian military and its operations, leading to some media outlets in Russia to stop reporting on Ukraine.^[150]​

On 9 July 2000, while speaking to the Russian Parliament, Putin advocated an economy policy^[151]​ which would have introduced a flat tax rate of 13%^[152]​ and a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 24 percent.^[152]​ Putin also intended for small businesses to get better treatment under this economic reform package. Under Putin, the old system which included high tax rates has been replaced with a new system where companies can choose either a 6 percent tax on gross revenue or a 15 percent tax on profits.^[152]​

In February 2009, Putin called for a single VAT rate to be "as low as possible" (at the time it stood at an average rate of 18 percent), which could be reduced to between 12 percent and 13 percent.^[153]​ The overall tax burden was lower in Russia under Putin than in most European countries.^[154]​

According to Dr Mark Smith (March 2003), Putin had developed a "corporatist system" in the sense that under him the Kremlin was interested in close ties with business organizations such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Delovaya Rossiya and the trade union federation (FNPR).^[72]​ This was a part of Putins attempts to involve broad sectors of society in the making and implementation of policy.^[72]​

"There is a school of thought which says that a number of Putin's steps in the economy (notably the fate of Yukos) were signs of a shift toward a system normally described as state capitalism,^[155]​^[156]​^[157]​ where "the entirety of state-owned and controlled enterprises are run by and for the benefit of the cabal around Putin—a collection of former KGB colleagues, Saint Petersburg lawyers, and other political cronies", he said in his words.^[158]​

According to Andrey Illarionov, advisor of Putin until 2005, Putin policies were a new socio-political order "distinct from any seen in our country before" as members of the Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators had taken over the entire body of state power, followed an omertà-like behavior code and were "given instruments conferring power upon others—membership "perks", such as the right to carry and use weapons". According to Illarionov, this "Corporation has seized key government agencies—the Tax Service, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the government-controlled mass media—which are now used to advance the interests of [Corporation] members. Through those agencies, every significant resource in the country—security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial—is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members".^[159]​ Members of the Corporation formed an isolated caste and according to an anonymous former KGB general cited by The Economist, "[a] Chekist is a breed ... A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's siloviki. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged.^[160]​

Jason Bush, chief of the Moscow bureau of the magazine Business Week has commented in December 2006 on troubling growth of government's role: "The Kremlin has taken control of some two dozen Russian companies since 2004 making them public property, including oil assets from Sibneft and Yukos, as well as banks, newspapers, and more. Despite his sporadic support for pro-market reforms, Putin has backed national champions such as energy concerns Gazprom and Rosneft. The private sector's share of output fell from 70% to 65% last year, while public owned companies now represent 38% of stock market capitalization, up from 22% a year ago".^[161]​

On 20 September 2008 and when the late 2000s recession had started to hit the well-being of Russia's top tycoons, the Financial Times said that "Putinism was built on the understanding that if tycoons played by Kremlin rules they would prosper".^[162]​

Although Russia's state intervention in the economy had been usually criticized in the West, a study by Bank of Finland's Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) in 2008 showed that state intervention had had a positive impact on the corporate governance of many companies in Russia as the formal indications of the quality of corporate governance in Russia were higher in companies with state control or with a stake held by the government.^[163]​

In 2005, Putin launched National Priority Projects in the fields of health care, education, housing and agriculture. In his May 2006 annual speech, Putin proposed increasing maternity benefits and prenatal care for women. Putin was strident about the need to reform the judiciary considering the present federal judiciary "Sovietesque", wherein many of the judges hand down the same verdicts as they would under the old Soviet judiciary structure and preferring instead a judiciary that interpreted and implemented the code to the current situation. In 2005, responsibility for federal prisons was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice.

The most high-profile change within the national priority project frameworks was probably the 2006 across-the-board increase in wages in healthcare and education as well as the decision to modernise equipment in both sectors in 2006 and 2007.^[164]​

During Putin's government, poverty was cut more than half.^[36]​

In 2006, chief of Business Week's Moscow bureau Jason Bush commented on the condition of Russian middle class: "This group has grown from just 8 million in 2000 to 55 million today and now accounts for some 37% of the population, estimates Expert, a market research firm in Moscow. That's giving a lift to the mood in the country. The share of Russians who think life is 'not bad' has risen to 23% from just 7% in 1999, while those who find living conditions 'unacceptable' has dropped to 29% from 53%, according to a recent poll". However, "[n]ot everyone has shared in the prosperity. Far from it. The average Russian earns $330 a month, just 10% of the U.S. average. Only a third of households own a car, and many—particularly the elderly—have been left behind".^[161]​

At the end of Putin's second term, Jonathan Steele has commented on Putin's legacy: "What, then, is Putin's legacy? Stability and growth, for starters. After the chaos of the 90s, highlighted by Yeltsin's attack on the Russian parliament with tanks in 1993 and the collapse of almost every bank in 1998, Putin has delivered political calm and a 7% annual rate of growth. Inequalities have increased and many of the new rich are grotesquely crass and cruel, but not all the Kremlin's vast revenues from oil and gas have gone into private pockets or are being hoarded in the government's "stabilisation fund". Enough has gone into modernising schools and hospitals so that people notice a difference. Overall living standards are up. The second Chechen war, the major blight on Putin's record, is almost over".^[165]​

In June 2008, a group of Finnish economists wrote that the 2000s had so far been an economic boon for Russia, with GDP rising about 7% a year and by the beginning of 2008 Russia had become one of the ten largest economies in the world.^[166]​

In Putin's first term, many new economic reforms were implemented along the lines of the "Gref program". The multitude of reforms ranged from a flat income tax to bank reform, from land ownership to improvements in conditions for small businesses.^[166]​

In 1998, over 60% of industrial turnover in Russia was based on barter and various monetary surrogates. The use of such alternatives to money now today fallen out of favour, which has boosted economic productivity significantly. Besides raising wages and consumption, Putin's government has received broad praise also for eliminating this problem.^[166]​

In the opinion of the Finnish researchers, the most high-profile change within the national priority project frameworks was probably the 2006 across-the-board increase in wages in healthcare and education as well as the decision to modernise equipment in both sectors in 2006 and 2007.^[166]​

The rise in the overall living standards further deepened Russia's social and geographical discrepancies. In July 2008, Edward Lucas of The Economist wrote: "The colossal bribe-collecting opportunities created by Putinism have heightened the divide between big cities (particularly Moscow) and the rest of the country".^[167]​^[168]​

In November 2008, the retired KGB lieutenant-general Nikolai Leonov, in assessing the overall results of Putin's economic policies for the period of 8 years, said that [w]ithin this period, there has only been one positive thing, if you leave aside the trivia. And that thing is the price of oil and natural gas".^[169]​ In the closing paragraphs of his 2008 book, the retired general said: "Behind the gilded facade of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, there lies a demolished country that, under the current characteristics of those in power, has no chance to restore itself as one of the developed states of the world".^[170]​^[171]​

On 29 November 2008, Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of Russian Federation (the largest opposition group within Russia with its 13% of seats in the national Parliament), in his speech before the 13th Party Congress lamented that due to "heroic efforts" of the "Yeltsinites" the country has lost 5 out of the 22 million square kilometers of its "historical territory" and that Russia faces de-industrialization, de-population and mental debilitation. The ruling group has in his opinion no notable successes to boast of, no clear plan of action and is only focussed on staying in power at all costs.^[172]​

To characterize the kind of state Putin had built in socio-economic terms, in early 2008 professor Marshall I. Goldman coined the term "petrostate" in Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia,^[173]​ where he inter alia argued that while Putin had followed the advice of economic advisers in implementing reforms such as a 13 percent flat tax and creating a stabilization fund to lessen inflationary pressure, his main personal contribution was the idea of creating "national champions" and the renationalization of major energy assets. In his June 2008 interview, Marshall Goldman said that in his opinion Putin had created a new class of oligarchs, whom some called "silogarchs", Russia having come in second in the Forbes magazine list of the world's billionaires after only the United States.^[174]​

In December 2008, Anders Åslund pointed out that Putin's chief project had been "to develop huge, unmanageable state-owned mastodons, considered "national champions"", which had "stalemated large parts of the economy through their inertia and corruption while impeding diversification".^[175]​

On 14 November 2016, Elvira Nabiullina, the head of Central Bank of Russia, stated that "the previous model which based upon exporting raw materials and stimulating consumption, including through consumer lending, has been exhausted; this was manifested in «the fading of the rates of economic growth before the crisis and the drop in oil prices".^[176]​

Russian economist Dmitriy Prokofiev believes that the new economic model of Putin's Russia is based on the same principles that were used during the Stalin's five-year plans. The essence of this system is to provide investment in large projects under the patronage of the government and guarantee the income of the political and economic elite by direct and indirect uptake of money from the population. As a result of cheap labour and expensive capital policy, economic entities use labour-based and not capital-intensive technologies. At the same time, the impoverishment of the population and the decrease of the domestic consumer demand forces economic entities to seek objects for investment outside Russia. That is why the profits of large companies and their owners do not affect the income of individuals.^[177]​

New economic model was named «People are new oil». This phrase entered the lexicon of Russian bureaucrats believing that citizens are the source of income and benefits, but not an object of concern and care.^[178]​

The particular manifestations of the new economic model are the following: freezing of the funded part of the pension from 2014 until at least the end of 2023,^[179]​ raising the retirement age,^[180]​ value added tax rate hike,^[181]​ income tax on natural persons rate hike,^[182]​ reviving the Stalin's practice of using the prisoner's labour.^[183]​

Since 2013, the incomes of Russian residents are declining for eight years in a row.^[184]​

In June 2000, Putin's decree was approved by the "Concept of the Russian Federation's foreign policy". According to this document, the main objectives of foreign policy are the following:

• Ensuring reliable security of the country.
• The impact of global processes in order to create a stable, just and democratic world order.
• The creation of favorable external conditions for the onward development of Russian.
• Formation of the Neighbourhood zone around the perimeter of the Russian borders.
• Search agreement and coinciding interests with foreign countries and international associations in the process of solving problems, Russia's national priorities.
• Protecting the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad.
• Promote a positive perception of the Russian Federation in the world.

On 10 February 2007, Putin delivered a confrontational speech in Munich where, inter alia, he accused the West of breaking the promise not to expand NATO into new countries in Eastern Europe believing that is a threat to Russia's national security. According to John Lough, associate fellow of the Chatham House, Putin's statement was based on the myth that the West deceived Russia by reneging on its promises at the end of the Cold War not to enlarge NATO and chose to pass up the opportunity to integrate Russia into a new European security framework and instead encouraged Moscow back on to a path of confrontation with the United States and its allies. In fact, the Soviet Union neither asked for nor was given any formal guarantees that there would be no further expansion of NATO beyond the territory of a united Germany and, in addition, the Soviet Union signed the Charter of Paris in November 1990 with the commitment to 'fully recognize the freedom of States to choose their own security arrangements'.^[185]​ In opinion of Andrey Kolesnikov, senior fellow of the Carnegie Moscow Center, this speech was the "foul of the last hope": Russian president wanted to scare the West with his frankness believing that, perhaps, "western partners" would take into account his concerns and make several steps forward to meet him. It had a reverse effect but this scenario was also calculated: either you will or you will not, Russia will be transforming from the fragment of the West into the super-sovereign island. Seeing as what happened thereafter, he decided for himself that he is free in his actions: because he had not succeeded in becoming a world leader by western rules, he would become a world leader by his own rules.^[186]​

In a 2010 article in the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung dedicated to the participation in the annual economic forum, it was proposed to create a European economic alliance stretching from Vladivostok to Lisbon. As steps towards the creation of the alliance indicates a possible unification of customs tariffs and technical regulations, the abolition of the visa regime with the European Union.^[187]​

In August 2013, according to experts the Russian-American relations have reached their lowest point since the end of the Cold War era. The September President Barack Obama's visit to Moscow and his talks with Putin were canceled due to temporary asylum in Russia, a former employee of the CIA Edward Snowden, disagreements on the situation in Syria and the problems with human rights in Russia.^[188]​ Russia has a long history of Anti-Americanism, dating back to the early days of the Cold War. In some of the latest Russian population polls, the United States and its allies consistently top the list of greatest enemies.^[189]​^[190]​ Survey results published by the Levada-Center indicate that, as of August 2018, Russians increasingly viewed the United States positively following the Russia–U.S. summit in Helsinki in July 2018.^[191]​ But only 14% of Russians expressed net approval of Donald Trump's policies in 2019.^[192]​ According to the Pew Research Center, "57% of Russians ages 18 to 29 see the U.S. favorably, compared with only 15% of Russians ages 50 and older."^[193]​

On 11 September 2013, The New York Times published an article by Putin, "Russia calls for caution". It is written in the form of an open letter to the American people, containing an explanation of the Russian political line against the Syrian conflict. It is also the Russian president warns against President Obama's thesis "About the exclusivity of the American nation". The article caused a mixed reaction of the world community.^[194]​

In 2013, Putin won the first place in the annual ranking of most influential people in the world by Forbes.^[195]​ In 2014, the result was the same.^[196]​

On 18 March 2014, Vladimir Putin gave the Crimean speech. Many Russian and foreign public figures compared this speech to Hitler's speech on Sudetenland from 1939 as using "the same arguments and vision of history".^[197]​^[198]​ Pro-Kremlin politologist Andranik Migranyan opposed to the position of the historian Andrey Zubov^[199]​ and stated that there was a difference between Adolf Hitler before 1939 and Hitler after 1939, and after the annexation of Crimea Putin should be compared with "good Hitler".^[200]​

On 24 October 2014, Vladimir Putin made the Valdai speech in which he accused the United States of undermining the world order^[201]​ and predicted that the clash would not be the last to pit Russia and the United States against each other.^[202]​ Putin threatened "sharp increase in the likelihood of a whole set of violent conflicts with either direct or indirect participation by the world's major powers" including those arising from "internal instability in certain countries" "located at the intersections of major states’ geopolitical interests, or on the border of cultural, historical, and economic civilizational continents", citing the example of Ukraine^[203]​ and warning that this example "will certainly not be the last".^[204]​

In September 2015, Putin spoke at the United Nations General Assembly session in New York City for the first time in 10 years. In his speech, he urged the formation of a broad anti-terrorist coalition to combat ISIS and blamed the events in Ukraine on "external forces", warned the West against unilateral sanctions, attempts to push Russia from the world market and export of color revolutions. For the first time, he also held a meeting with President Obama to discuss the situation in Syria and Ukraine, but in the outcome of the negotiations and despite the persistence of deep contradictions the experts saw a faint hope for a compromise and the warming of relations between the two countries.^[205]​

In September 2015, Vladimir Putin sent Russian troops in Syria supporting Bashar al-Assad in his war against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Al-Nusra Front and also Syrian opposition militant groups opposed to the Syrian government.^[206]​^[207]​^[208]​^[209]​^[210]​ Wagner Group, affiliated to Putin's close circle and tacitly coordinated by GRU, was also used in the war against Assad's opponents.^[211]​^[212]​^[213]​

Putin supported Nicolás Maduro in Venezuelan presidential crisis^[214]​ and sent Russian troops led by the chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General ru to Caracas.^[215]​

On 29 August 2020, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia accepts the election result of Belarusian presidential election and recognizes Alexander Lukashenko as legitimate President of Belarus.^[216]​ Earlier, in mid-August 2020, there were reports that several dozen trucks, identical to the ones used by the National Guard of Russia, without registration plates and any marks, were sighted in Smolensk Oblast and Pskov Oblast heading toward Belarusian border. In Conflict Intelligence Team assessment, these trucks could carry no less than 600 soldiers.^[217]​ Kremlin did not confirm the sending Russian troops to Belarus, said that events in Belarus did not yet warrant Russia's military involvement and condemned alleged foreign interference in Belarus's affairs by Western countries against the backdrop of mass protests in Belarus.^[218]​ Hans van Baalen considered that Russian intervention in Belarus is already a fact.^[219]​

Shortly after the Beslan terror act in September 2004, Putin enhanced a Kremlin-sponsored program aimed at "improving Russia's image" abroad.^[220]​ According to an unnamed former Duma deputy, there existed a classified article in the RF federal budget that provided for financing measures to this purpose.^[221]​

One of the major projects of the program was the creation in 2005 of Russia Today—a rolling English-language TV news channel providing 24-hour news coverage, modeled on CNN. Towards its start-up budget, $30 million of public funds were allocated.^[222]​^[223]​ A CBS News story on the launch of Russia Today quoted Boris Kagarlitsky as saying it was "very much a continuation of the old Soviet propaganda services".^[224]​ In 2007, Russia Today employed nearly 100 English-speaking special correspondents worldwide.^[225]​

Russia's deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin said in August 2008 in the context of the Russia-Georgia conflict: "Western media is a well-organized machine, which is showing only those pictures that fit in well with their thoughts. We find it very difficult to squeeze our opinion into the pages of their newspapers".^[226]​ Similar views were expressed by some Western commentators.^[227]​^[228]​

William Dunbar, who was reporting then for Russia Today from Georgia, said he had not been on air since he mentioned Russian bombing of targets inside Georgia on 9 August 2008 and had to resign over what he claimed was biased coverage by the outlet.^[226]​^[229]​

The public relations efforts notwithstanding, according to an opinion poll released in February 2009 by the BBC World Service, Russia's image around the world had taken a dramatic dive in 2008: forty-two percent of respondents said they had a "mainly negative" view of Russia, according to the poll, which surveyed more than 13,000 people in 21 countries in December and January.^[230]​

In June 2007, Vedomosti reported that the Kremlin had been intensifying its official lobbying activities in the United States since 2003, among other things hiring such companies as Hannaford Enterprises and Ketchum.^[231]​

In the 2012 Moskovskiye Novosti magazine article "Russia and changing world",^[232]​ Putin directly stated that Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation and Russkiy Mir Foundation are Russia's international lobbying tools.

In accordance with 26 Article of Federal Law of 24 May 1999, No.99-FZ, Worldwide Congress of Compatriots is the highest body that ensures interaction between Russian compatriots and Russia's authorities; in the inter-Congress period, the executive functions in the sphere of interaction between Russian compatriots and Russia's authorities are carried out by ru.^[233]​

ru is another organization that unify different movements of Russian émigrés. International Council of Russian Compatriots was founded after the congress with the participation of Vladimir Putin, which was held in 2001.

In opinion of Dmitry Khmelnitsky, Soviet and German architect and historian, the Russian network of agents of influence abroad is extraordinarily broad and differentiated. It consists of a multitude of organizations created and financed by Moscow and under social groups and simulating social, cultural and scholarly activity. Some of these organizations are directed at the local communities, others at émigrés from the Soviet Union and Russia, although sometimes both these tasks are addressed by one and the same organizations. Their classification by itself is worthy of attention because under this format, the Russian special services work in all the countries of the world. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Moscow has created several major and many minor organizations to work with Russian and Soviet emigres. Among the most important are the International Council of Russian Compatriots, the Worldwide Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad, the Worldwide Congress of Russian-Speaking Jewry and the Russkiy Mir Foundation, a pass-through funding group which now operates more than 200 Russian centers around the world. But it is only the tip of the iceberg.^[234]​

The Russian network of agents of influence in Western countries included even military-patriotic camps where Russian-speaking youth received military training.^[235]​^[236]​ The activity of the one of such camps caused a scandal in Serbian society.^[237]​ Some pro-Kremlin Russian diaspora organizations are under the investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.^[238]​

Russian Armed Forces underwent various reforms during Putin's rule. The first reform was announced by minister of defence Sergei Ivanov in 2001 and was completed in 2004. As a result of the reform, constant combat readiness military units, staffed with volunteers only, appeared in Russia but draft system had been retained.^[239]​ As of 2008, there were 20% constant combat readiness military units, manned to wartime standards, and 80% cadre military units, manned to peacetime standards, in Russian Armed Forces.^[240]​

After the Russo-Georgian War, it became clear that Russian military organization needed further reform; as Vladimir Shamanov said, cadre regiments and divisions, intended for receiving mobilization resources and deployment in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war, have become a costly relic.^[241]​ On 14 October 2008, minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov announced the beginning of new reform.^[242]​ The main organizational change was the transition from a 4-level operational chain of command (Military District – Army – Division – Regiment) to a 3-level one (Military District – Operational Command (Army) – Brigade).^[243]​ Also Russia fully refused cadre military units, manned to peacetime standards (so-called "paper divisions"), and since that times only constant combat readiness military units, 100% manned up to wartime standards, were part of Russian Armed Forces.^[244]​ On 31 October 2010, Anatoly Serdyukov stated that changes in organizational-regular structure was completed.^[245]​

According to Alexander Golts, journalist and military columnist, as a result of aforementioned reforms, Russia gained absolute military dominance in the post-Soviet area and Russian Armed Forces gained the ability that it had never had: ability to quick deployment, which was clearly demonstrated on 26 February 2014.^[247]​

Some military experts^[¿cuál?] mentioned that since the Annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia organized many new military units and formations without a significant increase in the number of volunteers and conscripts, prompting them to consider these units "paper divisions".^[248]​^[249]​^[250]​ However, in 2018, Russia began to form a military reserve force staffed by volunteers selected from among retired active duty soldiers.^[251]​ Reservists serve in conventional military units; thus, reserve units are staffed to wartime standards and are therefore indistinguishable from regular units. The number of reservists is not made available to the public in open sources or from the Ministry of Defence. This makes it difficult for establish real troop strength of new Russian military formations.^{[cita requerida]}

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia had been in the top 5 military spenders since 2006, except 2018, and Russia's military expenditure reached $61.7 billion in 2020.^[252]​ In RBK assessment, based on 2017 Federal State Statistics Service data, budget expenditures, classified as state secret, reached 5,3% of gross domestic product.^[253]​ In 2021, the 15% of budget expenditures are classified as state secret.^[254]​

In Andrey Piontkovsky's opinion, Putin feels frustration towards the Soviet Union's defeat in the Cold War — which Piontkovsky calls a "Third World War" — and seeks to defeat the West in a "Fourth World War." In fact, Putin has started this war in 2014 with annexation of Crimea, more specifically since 20 February 2014 – this date is specified in the Medal "For the Return of Crimea".^[255]​ Piontkovsky believes that geopolitical thinking of Putin and his close circle was reflected in the 2018 "Zavtra" magazine article by Alexander Khaldey:^[256]​

Piontkovsky considers that Putin's strategical purposes are following: 1) the installation of Russian military and political control under post-Soviet area and, perhaps, Central Europe; 2) the discrediting of NATO as unable to protect its members; 3) the entrenching Russia's sphere of interest in Europe through new "Yalta Agreement" with humiliated USA. These goals should be achieved through 3 elements:^[257]​

• Gerasimov doctrine of hybrid war
• Patrushev doctrine of nuclear blackmail
• Russian traditional despising an own citizens lives that provides an advantage over "hedonistic West"

The Gerasimov doctrine^[258]​ enunciates wide use of so-called non-linear warfare and reflexive control (propaganda, cyberattacks, diplomatic actions, economic instruments, bribing foreign public officials, etc.); specifically fighting are carried out by special forces and mercenaries under the guise of local partisans. This doctrine declares that non-military tactics are not auxiliary to the use of force but the preferred way to win; that they are, in fact, the actual war.^[259]​ The difference between Gerasimov doctrine and Western views of hybrid conflict is that Russian doctrine combines both low-end, hidden state involvement with high-end, direct, even braggadocio superpower involvement.^[260]​ Russian hybrid warfare conduct aims to create a "hallucinating fog of war" and consistent deception that aims not to paralyze the West's intelligence and anticipatory capabilities, but to alter Western analytical end-results and perceptions of Russia's strategic intentions.^[261]​ The Gerasimov doctrine has been directly applied by Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War.^[262]​

The essence of the Patrushev doctrine boils down to "de-escalation through nuclear escalation". Russia would cause a direct military conflict against NATO in any region outside Russian territory, for example in the Baltic States, avoiding the use of weapons of mass destruction. At first, Russia would succeed, using an element of surprise, but later a turning point in the war would be achieved to the benefit of NATO. At that time, Russia would threaten to use nuclear weapons, and if the threats do not succeed, Russia would launch a limited nuclear strike on targets in Europe. If the West decide to make a limited nuclear retaliatory strike, then Russia would make a larger nuclear strike on targets in Europe and USA. Kremlin strategists believe that the West would flinch first, giving up to "strong-willed Russia", and would agree to end the war on Putin's terms.^[263]​ American response to Russian Patrushev doctrine has been so-called Pompeo doctrine,^[264]​ the major standpoints of which were set out in the 2018 US National Defense Strategy, in which for the first time since the end of the Cold War Russia was designated as a global power and principal opponent of the USA. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review declared that the key objective of U.S. nuclear policy is to dissuade Russia from its mistaken impression that a first-use of nuclear weapons by Russia in a conflict would de-escalate the conflict with terms favorable to Russia.^[265]​ As in the Cold War times, the Arctic can be the area of potential NATO-Russia conflict.^[266]​

On March 7, 2024, American President Joe Biden given the 2024 State of the Union Address where he compared Russia under Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler's conquests of Europe.^[267]​

Political scientist Irina Pavlova said that chekists were not merely a corporation of people united to expropriate financial assets as they had long-standing political objectives of transforming Moscow to the Third Rome and an ideology of "containing" the United States.^[268]​ Columnist George Will emphasized in 2003 the nationalistic nature of Putinism: "Putinism is becoming a toxic brew of nationalism directed against neighboring nations, and populist envy, backed by assaults of state power, directed against private wealth. Putinism is a form of national socialism without the demonic element of its pioneer".^[269]​ According to Illarionov, the ideology of chekists is nashism ("ours-ism"), the selective application of rights.^[159]​

According to Dmitri Trenin (2004), Head of the Carnegie Moscow Center, the then Russia was one of the least ideological countries around the world: "Ideas hardly matter, whereas interests reign supreme. It is not surprising then that the worldview of Russian elites is focused on financial interests. Their practical deeds in fact declare In capital we trust". Trenin described Russia's elite involved in the process of policy-making as people who largely owned the country. Most of them were not public politicians, but the majority were bureaucratic capitalists. According to Trenin, "having survived in a ruthless domestic business and political environment, Russian leaders are well adjusted to rough competition and will take that mindset to the world stage". However, Trenin called Russian-Western relations, from Moscow's perspective, "competitive, but not antagonistic". He said that "Russia does not crave world domination, and its leaders do not dream of restoring the Soviet Union. They plan to rebuild Russia as a great power with a global reach, organized as a supercorporation".^[270]​

According to Trenin, Russians "no longer recognize U.S. or European moral authority". He said that "from the Russian perspective, there is no absolute freedom anywhere in the world, no perfect democracy, and no government that does not lie to its people. In essence, all are equal by virtue of sharing the same imperfections. Some are more powerful than others, however, and that is what really counts".^[270]​

In the opinion of Russian political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann, Putin's Russia practices "reverse cargo cult". In the original cargo cult, straw-manure airplanes were built in the vain hope that these would attract real airplanes made of aluminium delivering "cargo", i.e. foreign-made good the cultists desired and could not produce themselves. In a reverse cargo cult, believers deny there are any real, functioning airplanes made of aluminium anywhere -- all airplanes are made of straw and manure. The difference between more successful and less successful nations (reverse cargo cultists insist) lies in the possibility or impossibility to hide this fact. Embracing a political reverse cargo cult, the Russian political elite agrees Russia has the straw-and-manure equivalent of real democracy (there are no free and transparent elections, independent court, etc.), but the only true difference between its imitation institutions and those of Western countries is that the west has succeeded in "promoting" its governing system, deceiving the credulous and naive into thinking its democracy is "aluminum" and can actually fly. Russia's inability to "promote itself" (Putin's elite insists) not only has nothing to do with the quality of its governance, but is in fact proof of Russia's "spirituality, ethical purity and moral integrity", in contrast to a "cynical, corrupt and deceitful" West.^[271]​^[272]​

Some authors, such as Michael Hirsh, have described Putin as a "messianic" Russian nationalist and Eurasianist.^[274]​^[275]​^[276]​

Putin's views evolved over time. In his speech on 18 June 2004 at the international conference "Eurasian Integration: Trends of Modern Development and Challenges of Globalization", Putin said about the problems hindering integration: "I would say that these problems can be formulated very simply. This is great-power chauvinism, this is nationalism, this is the personal ambitions of those on whom political decisions depend, and, finally, this is just stupidity, ordinary cavemen's stupidity".^[277]​

From around 2014, the Putin regime embraced Great Russian chauvinism and began to actively promote it.^[278]​^[279]​ In July 2021, Putin published an essay titled On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, in which he states that Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians should be in one All-Russian nation as a part of the Russian world and are "one people" whom "forces that have always sought to undermine our unity" wanted to "divide and rule".^[280]​

In a speech on 21 February 2022, following the escalation in the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis,^[281]​ Putin made a number of claims about Ukrainian and Soviet history, including stating that modern Ukraine was created by the Bolsheviks in 1917 as part of a communist appeasement of nationalism of ethnic minorities in the former Russian Empire, specifically blaming Vladimir Lenin for "detaching Ukraine from Russia".^[282]​ Putin spoke of the "historic, strategic mistakes" that were made when in 1991 the USSR "granted sovereignty" to other Soviet republics on "historically Russian land" and called the entire episode "truly fatal".^[283]​ He described Ukraine as being turned into the "anti-Russia" by the West.^[284]​

On 24 February, Putin in a televised address announced a "special military operation" in Ukraine,^[285]​ launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.^[286]​

It is claimed that Putin models himself on the Tsar Peter the Great, whose reign is reminiscent of a Russian imperial greatness which the Kremlin is keen to promote. A presidential commission asked Putin in 2003 to grant the request of one of Nicholas II's last surviving relatives to rehabilitate the House of Romanov.^[287]​ Willing to regain the imperial grandeur of Russia, Putin invited the Romanov imperial family to return to Russia in July 2015.^[288]​ According to the presidential commission, this move would represent a significant final step in Russia's journey to embrace its imperial history.^[287]​

An alliance has been forged between the Church and the Kremlin since Putin became President of the Russian Federation. An adherent of the Russian Orthodox Church, Putin has allowed the regaining by the Orthodox Church of much of the importance that the Church had enjoyed in the Russian Empire and has won the enthusiastic support of its religious leaders.^[289]​

American historian Stanley G. Payne argued that Putin's political system is "more a revival of the creed of Tsar Nicholas I in the 19th century that emphasized 'Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality' than one resembling the revolutionary, modernizing regimes of Hitler and Mussolini."^[290]​

Some commentators have said that current Putin holds many neo-Soviet views, especially concerning social policies, law and order and military strategic defense.^[291]​

The first politically controversial step made by Putin, then the FSB Director, was restoring in June 1999 a memorial plaque to former Soviet leader and KGB director Yuri Andropov on the facade of the building, where the KGB had been headquartered.^[292]​

In late 2000, Putin submitted a bill to the State Duma to use the Soviet national anthem as the new Russian national anthem. The Duma voted in favor. The music remained identical, but new lyrics were written by the same author who wrote the Soviet lyrics.^[293]​

In September 2003, Putin was quoted as saying: "The Soviet Union is a very complicated page in the history of our peoples. It was heroic and constructive, and it was also tragic. But it is a page that has been turned. It's over, the boat has sailed. Now we need to think about the present and the future of our peoples".^[294]​

In February 2004, Putin said: "It is my deep conviction that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a national tragedy on a massive scale. I think the ordinary citizens of the former Soviet Union and the citizens in the post-Soviet space, the CIS countries, have gained nothing from it. On the contrary, people have been faced with a host of problems." He went on to say, "Incidentally, at that period, too, opinions varied, including among the leaders of the Union republics. For example, Nursultan Nazarbayev was categorically opposed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and he said so openly proposing various formulas for preserving the state within the common borders. But, I repeat, all that is in the past. Today we should look at the situation in which we live. One cannot keep looking back and fretting about it: we should look forward".^[295]​

In April 2005, during his formal address to Russia's Parliament, President Putin said: "Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself".^[296]​

In December 2007, Putin said in the interview to the Time magazine: "Russia is an ancient country with historical, profound traditions and a very powerful moral foundation. And this foundation is a love for the Motherland and patriotism. Patriotism in the best sense of that word. Incidentally, I think that to a certain extent, to a significant extent, this is also attributable to the American people".^[297]​

In August 2008, The Economist claimed: "Russia today is ruled by the KGB elite, has a Soviet anthem, servile media, corrupt courts and a rubber-stamping parliament. A new history textbook proclaims that the Soviet Union, although not a democracy, was 'an example for millions of people around the world of the best and fairest society'".^[141]​

In November 2008, International Herald Tribune stated:

The Kremlin in the Putin era has often sought to maintain as much sway over the portrayal of history as over the governance of the country. In seeking to restore Russia's standing, Putin and other officials have stoked a nationalism that glorifies Soviet triumphs while playing down or even whitewashing the system's horrors. As a result, throughout Russia, many archives detailing killings, persecution and other such acts committed by the Soviet authorities have become increasingly off-limits. The role of the security services seems especially delicate, perhaps because Putin is a former KGB agent who headed the agency's successor, the FSB, in the late 1990s.^[298]​

Putin has an amicable relationship with Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF).^[299]​^[300]​^[301]​^[302]​ Roger Boyes considers Putin more of a latter-day Leonid Brezhnev than a clone of Stalin.^[303]​

In August 2014, he rejected Vladimir Zhirinovsky's proposal to return the Imperial flag and anthem.^[304]​

On 30 October 2017, Putin opened the Wall of Grief, the first Russian memorial dedicated to the victims Stalinist repressions. It was seen as a gesture towards the Russian intelligentsia.^[305]​

In May 2000, The Guardian wrote: "When a band of former Soviet dissidents declared in February that Putinism was nothing short of modernised Stalinism, they were widely dismissed as hysterical prophets of doom. 'Authoritarianism is growing harsher, society is being militarised, the military budget is increasing,' they warned, before calling on the West to 're-examine its attitude towards the Kremlin leadership, to cease indulging it in its barbaric actions, its dismantlement of democracy and suppression of human rights.' In the light of Putin's actions during his first days in power, their warnings have gained an uneasy new resonance".^[307]​

In February 2007, Arnold Beichman, a conservative research fellow at the Hoover Institution, wrote in The Washington Times that "Putinism in the 21st century has become as significant a watchword as Stalinism was in the 20th".^[308]​

Also in 2007, Lionel Beehner, formerly a senior writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, maintained that on Putin's watch nostalgia for Stalin had grown even among young Russians and Russians' neo-Stalinism manifesting itself in several ways.^[309]​

In February 2007, responding to a listener's assertion that "Putin had steered the country to Stalinism" and "all entrepreneurs" were being jailed in Russia, the Russian opposition radio host Yevgeniya Albats said: "Come on, this is not true; there is no Stalinism, no concentration camps—thankfully". She went on to say that if citizens of the country would not be critical of what was occurring around them, referring to the "orchestrated, or genuine" calls for the "tsar to stay on", that "could blaze the trail for very ugly things and a very tough regime in our country".^[310]​

While some might argue that Putin's leadership does not reflect an ideology, Chris Miller has discerned three beliefs which are consistent with Putin's announcements and account for his actions. This three-part ideology must be understood in the context of the history of Russia and of Putin himself. When Putin began his political career, the Soviet Union was unable to effectively collect taxes or provide services in part due to inadequate governmental control of the empire. Putin believed that the government needed to first establish strong centralized control of the empire. To maintain that central control has always been his highest priority. Second, to keep the populace supportive of his government and thus to prevent revolt, Putin believes that the key is rising wages and pensions. In that way, he maintains enough of a popular base that the populace tends to tolerate other problems. Third, economic progress depends heavily on private enterprises but only so long as those enterprises do not interfere with either central government control or rising salaries and pensions. When a private enterprise threatens either belief one or two, then the government takes control of the enterprise so that the enterprise supports beliefs one and two. These three beliefs are not followed without some compromises, but Miller argues that these beliefs help explain the behavior of Putin.^[311]​

In June 2001, the BBC noted that a year after Putin took office, the Russian media had been reflecting on what some saw as a growing personality cult around him: Russia's TV-6 television had shown a vast choice of portraits of Putin on sale at a shopping mall in an underground passage near Moscow's Park of Culture.^[312]​

In October 2007, some scenes at the United Russia congress caused Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, who was allied to Russia within the "Union State", to recall the Soviet times, complete with the official adoration towards the Communist Party leader and talking to Russia's regional press representatives he said that in Russia ru was being created.^[313]​

In 2008, the Paris-based AFP reported that ahead of the December parliamentary and March presidential elections, in which despite being required by the constitution to leave office, Putin was widely expected to find some way to retain power as his personality cult was gathering pace.^[314]​

After Medvedev was elected president in March 2008, United States government-funded Radio Liberty reported that during his eight-year presidency Putin had managed to build a personality cult around himself similar to those created by Soviet leaders. Although there had not been giant statues of Putin put up across the country (like those of Stalin before), he had the honor of being the only Russian leader to have had a pop song written about him: "A man like Putin", which hit the charts in 2002.^[315]​

The formation and promotion of the Putin's personality cult have been provoking opposition political figures reactions, pointing out the negative changes in Putin's mentality. For example, in April 2014, in an interview with journalists Boris Nemtsov called Putin a mental patient. This statement was used as the basis for initiation of criminal proceeding against Nemtsov but, eventually, the case was requalified to administrative offence.^[316]​ In 2016, an application, requiring Putin's mental health check-ups and the termination his presidential authority on his mental illness ground under the procedure provided for in the article 92 of the Constitution of Russia, was lodged with Prime Minister of Russia. The negative response to this request was appealed to the court but the administrative claim was dismissed in 2017.^[317]​

In an interview with Spanish newspaper El País, Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny said that "It is difficult for me to understand exactly what is going on in [Putin's] mind. ... 20 years of power would spoil anyone and make them crazy. He thinks he can do whatever he wants."^[318]​

According to some scholars,^[319]​^[320]​ Russia under Putin has been transformed into an "FSB state".

Shortly after becoming Russian Prime Minister, Putin was reported to have joked to a group of his KGB associates: "A group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission".^[321]​^[322]​

The former Securitate Lieutenant General and defector Ion Mihai Pacepa wrote in National Review Online in 2006 that former KGB officers were running Russia and that FSB had the right to monitor the population electronically, control political process, search private property, cooperate with employees of the federal government, create front enterprises, investigate cases and run its own prisons.^[323]​

Various 2006 estimates showed that Russia had above 200,000 members of the FSB, or one FSB employee for every 700 citizens of Russia (the exact number of the overall FSB staff is classified).^[324]​ The Russian Armed Forces General Staff as well as its subordinate structures, such as the Russian Strategic Missile Troops headquarters, are not submitted to the Federal Security Service,^[325]​ but the FSB might be interested in monitoring such structures as they intrinsically involve state secrets and various degrees of admittance to them.^[326]​ The Law on Federal Security Service^[327]​ which defines its functions and establishes its structure does not involve such tasks as managing strategic branches of national industry, controlling political groups, or infiltrating the federal government.^[327]​

In 2006, political scientist Julie Anderson wrote: "Under Russian Federation President and former career foreign intelligence officer Vladimir Putin, an 'FSB State' composed of chekists has been established and is consolidating its hold on the country. Its closest partners are organized criminals. In a world marked by a globalized economy and information infrastructure, and with transnational terrorism groups utilizing all available means to achieve their goals and further their interests, Russian intelligence collaboration with these elements is potentially disastrous".^[319]​

Russian historian Yuri Felshtinsky compared the takeover of the Russian state by the siloviki to an imaginary scenario of the Gestapo coming to power in Germany after World War II. He pointed out a fundamental difference between the secret police and ordinary political parties, even totalitarian ones, such as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, i.e. Russia's secret police organizations are wont to employ the so-called active measures and extrajudicial killings, hence they killed Alexander Litvinenko and directed Russian apartment bombings and other terrorism acts in Russia to frighten the civilian population and achieve their political objectives, according to Felstinsky.^[328]​

In April 2006, Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Middle East specialist at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), presented a list of those who had "mysteriously" died during Putin's presidency and wrote: "Vladimir Putin's Russia is a new phenomenon in Europe: a state defined and dominated by former and active-duty security and intelligence officers. Not even fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union – all undoubtedly much worse creations than Russia – were as top-heavy with intelligence talent. [...] There is no historical precedent for a society so dominated by former and active-duty internal-security and intelligence officials – men who rose up in a professional culture in which murder could be an acceptable, even obligatory, business practice. [...] Those who operated within the Soviet sphere were the most malevolent in their practices. These men mentored and shaped Putin and his closest friends and allies. It is therefore unsurprising that Putin's Russia has become an assassination-happy state where detention, interrogation, and torture – all tried and true methods of the Soviet KGB – are used to silence the voices of untoward journalists and businessmen who annoy or threaten Putin's FSB state".^[329]​

One of the leading members of Putin's ruling elite, Nikolai Patrushev, Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (August 1999–May 2008) and subsequently Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, was known for his propagation of the idea of "chekists" as "neo-aristocrats" (en ruso: неодворяне).^[330]​^[331]​^[332]​

A report by Andrew C. Kuchins in November 2007 said: "The predominance of the intelligence services and mentality is a core feature of Putin's Russia that marks a major and critical discontinuity from not only the 1990s but all of Soviet and Russian history. During the Soviet period, the Communist Party provided the glue holding the system together. During the 1990s, there was no central organizing institution or ideology. Now, with Putin, it is "former" KGB professionals who dominate the Russian ruling elite. This is a special kind of brotherhood, a mafia-like culture in which only a few can be trusted. The working culture is secretive and nontransparent".^[333]​

Russia, under Putin's regime, has often been referred to as a kleptocracy and an oligarchy.^[335]​^[336]​ In 2000, Russia's political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky called Putinism "the highest and culminating stage of bandit capitalism in Russia".^[337]​ He said that "Russia is not corrupt. Corruption is what happens in all countries when businessmen offer officials large bribes for favors. Today's Russia is unique. The businessmen, the politicians, and the bureaucrats are the same people. They have privatized the country's wealth and taken control of its financial flows".^[338]​ According to scholar Karen Dawisha, 110 of Putin's cronies control 35% of Russia's wealth.^[339]​

In concluding her book A Russian Diary (2007), the Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya said: "Our state authorities today are only interested in making money. That is literally all they are interested in".^[340]​

Such views were shared by politologist Julie Anderson who said the same person can be a Russian intelligence officer, an organized criminal and a businessman,^[319]​ who quoted the former CIA Director James Woolsey as saying: "I have been particularly concerned for some years, beginning during my tenure, with the interpenetration of Russian organized crime, Russian intelligence and law enforcement, and Russian business. I have often illustrated this point with the following hypothetical: If you should chance to strike up a conversation with an articulate, English-speaking Russian in, say, the restaurant of one of the luxury hotels along Lake Geneva, and he is wearing a $3,000 suit and a pair of Gucci loafers, and he tells you that he is an executive of a Russian trading company and wants to talk to you about a joint venture, then there are four possibilities. He may be what he says he is. He may be a Russian intelligence officer working under commercial cover. He may be part of a Russian organized crime group. But the really interesting possibility is that he may be all three and that none of those three institutions have any problem with the arrangement".^[341]​

In April 2006, Putin himself expressed extreme irritation about the de facto privatization of the customs sphere, where smart officials and entrepreneurs "merged in ecstasy".^[343]​

According to the estimates published in "Putin and Gazprom" by Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, Putin and his friends pilfered assets of $80 billion from Gazprom during his second term as president.^[344]​^[345]​

On 29 January 2009, Russian billionaire Alexander Lebedev claimed that Prime Minister Putin's strategy for economic recovery was based on cronyism and was fueling corruption and also said: "We have two Putins. There are lots of words, but the system doesn't work".^[346]​

In March 2017, Alexei Navalny and the Anti-Corruption Foundation published another in-depth investigation of properties and residences used by Dmitry Medvedev and his family. A report called He Is Not Dimon To You shows how Medvedev allegedly owns and controls large areas of land, villas, palaces, yachts, expensive apartments, wineries and estates through complicated ownership structures involving shell companies and foundations.^[347]​

Russians critical of the 2022 Russian mobilization have used social media and other electronic means (e.g. Twitter) to enquire en masse Russia's top officials and deputies, who supported war with Ukraine and mobilization, whether they themselves or their sons would go to the front. Most of them either refused to answer or gave excuses, such as Alexey Mishustin (premier Mikhail Mishustin's son), ignored the citizens' questions (Moscow city council deputy Andrey Zyuganov, the grandson of Gennady Zyuganov) or blocked the person asking (e.g. Dmitry Rogozin's reaction to the BBC question on Twitter, whether he has advised his son Alexey to volunteer)^[348]​ Nikolay Peskov, the son of Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov, told pranksters, who pretended to be recruitment officers, that he had no intention of going to war and would resolve the issue "on a different level."^[349]​^[350]​ It was seen as an example of nepotism in Putin's Russia.^[350]​

The Panama Papers revealed a network of secret offshore deals and vast loans worth $2bn (£1.4bn) that seem to lay a trail to Russia's President Vladimir Putin. The transactions include fake share deals; multimillion-dollar charges for vague "consultancy" services; and repeated payments of large sums in "compensation" for allegedly cancelled share deals and a $200m loan for $1. Though his name does not appear in any of the records, the data shows how deals that seemingly could not have been secured without his patronage made members of his close circle fabulously wealthy.^[351]​ Putin's name does not appear in any of the records released to date, but those of his associates do. Construction billionaires Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, musician Sergei Roldugin, business magnate Alisher Usmanov and billionaire Gennady Timchenko are mentioned in the leaked documents.^[351]​

On 19 January 2021, the documentary film Putin's Palace. History of World's Largest Bribe produced by the Anti-Corruption Foundation was released on YouTube. The film investigates the Residence at Cape Idokopas commonly known as Putin's Palace that it claims was constructed for President Vladimir Putin and details a corruption scheme allegedly headed by Putin involving the construction of the palace. The film estimates that the residence, located near the town of Gelendzhik in Krasnodar Krai, cost over ₽100 billion (approximately $1.35 billion) with what it says was "the largest bribe in history".

The film Putin's Palace. History of World's Largest Bribe is the best known but neither the first nor last investigation of the corruption scheme in the construction of the Residence at Cape Idokopas.

According to David Satter, Yuri Felshtinsky, Alexander Litvinenko, Vladimir Pribylovsky and Boris Kagarlitsky, the bombings were a successful false flag operation coordinated by the Russian state security services to win public support for a new full-scale war in Chechnya and to bring Putin to power.^[352]​^[353]​^[354]​^[355]​^[356]​^[357]​^[358]​^[359]​ ^[360]​ Some of them described the bombings as typical "active measures" practised by the KGB in the past. The war in Chechnya boosted Prime Minister and former FSB Director Vladimir Putin's popularity, and brought the pro-war Unity Party to the State Duma and Putin to the presidency within a few months.

• Putinland
• Putinversteher
• Recovery and growth of the Russian economy (1999–2008)
• Russian oligarchs
• Putinism
• History of the Russian Federation
• Political groups under Vladimir Putin's presidency
• Spain under Francisco Franco

• Breslauer, George W. and Colton, Timothy J. 2017. Russia Beyond Putin. Daedalus (journal).

• "Putinism: the ideology" – 1:20 lecture by professor Anne Applebaum spoken in London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), recorded on Monday 28 January 2013.
• "Putinism and Russian Protest" – 2:00 panel lecture/discussion in University of California Television, published on 29 October 2012.
• "Can Putin Contain Post-Putinism?" – 1:20 lecture at ICDS (International Centre for Defence Studies), published on 28 November 2012.
• Haroon, Agha Iqrar. "The "Putinist Approach" and "Half hearted" European Union—Ukraine is a story of a "Love Triangle" of a beautiful lady being loved by two men" (enlace roto disponible en este archivo). (4 December 2013).

Category:2000s in Russia Category:2010s in Russia Category:2020s in Russia Category:Presidency of Russia Category:History of Russia (1991–present)

El Sistema de Financiación Autonómica (SFA) es el conjunto de normas que rigen la redistribución del presupuesto español entre las Comunidades de régimen foral, las Comunidades Autónomas de régimen común y las Ciudades autónomas. En total, redistribuye aproximadamente el 25 % del presupuesto español, mientras el gobierno central controla aproximadamente un 50 % del presupuesto y los ayuntamientos y las entidades locales otro 25 %. El actual modelo se aprobó en 2009 con arreglo a la ley 22/2009, de 18 de diciembre, por la que se regula el sistema de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas de régimen común y Ciudades con Estatuto de Autonomía y se modifican determinadas normas tributarias. ^[1]​ Desde 2023, el Ministerio de Hacienda cuenta con una propuesta de reforma surgida de la Comisión de Expertos del Comité Técnico Permanente de Evaluación (CTPE). ^[2]​

Columna al 50 %

Con el término generación de la Democracia se denomina a un conjunto de intelectuales y escritores españoles del siglo xx que se dio a conocer en el panorama cultural alrededor de 1975,​ coincidiendo con la irrupción de la joven democracia española. España, que acababa de salir de una dictadura de 40 años que comenzó con una guerra fratricida, atravesó una difícil Transición política tras la muerte de dictador Francisco Franco. En puridad, la naciente Democracia española surgió con la aprobación de la Constitución de 1978. Sin embargo, desde los primeros años de la década de 1970 se instala en el panorama intelectual y político un grupo de personas que van a protagonizar los cambios trascendentales del país, ejemplo de transición pacífica donde los haya.

En general, se puede afirmar que la Democracia española hubo de superar innumerables obstáculos n un corto plazo de tiempo. En efecto, legalizados los partidos de la oposición al régimen franquista, fundamentalmente PSOE y Partido Comunista de España, en la primavera de 1978, y convocadas las primeras elecciones democráticas en España desde 1936 para el día 15 de junio de 1977, los nuevos partidos políticos españoles se movilizaron en poco tiempo para cerrar las heridas de 40 años de dictadura.

El nuevo Parlamento, tomó la decisión de elaborar una Constitución que uniera la joven democracia española con la Constitución de 1931. Esa Constitución fue aprobada Constitución de 1978 en diciembre de 1978

La literatura ha de superar aún viejos resabios de la poesía novísima. Entre 1980 y 2000 esta nueva generación novelística ha dado nombres como: Javier Marías.^[2]​

Los elegidos, quizá en representación de una nómina que podría ser más amplia, son Rafael Argullol, Adela Cortina, Félix Duque, Javier Echevarría, Víctor Gómez Pin, José Jiménez, Miguel Morey, Javier Sádaba y Eugenio Trías.^[3]​

La generación de los Novísimos, con Pere Gimferrer a la cabeza, se integra a la perfección en esa generación de la Democracia que aúna poesía, novela y arte.

• Paul Preston : Franco: caudillo de España. Barcelona : Círculo de Lectores, 1994. ISBN 84-226-5204-8.
• Paul Preston : Franco: a biography. London : HarperCollins, 1993. ISBN 0-00-215863-9

Do ponto de vista da sua competência organizativa interna, compete ao Tribunal Constitucional eleger o seu Presidente e Vice-Presidente, elaborar os regulamentos internos necessários ao seu bom funcionamento, aprovar a proposta de orçamento anual, fixar no início de cada ano o calend��rio das suas sessões ordinárias e exercer outras competências atribuídas por lei.

O Presidente e Vice-Presidente são eleitos pelos juízes do Tribunal Constitucional, por voto secreto, sem discussão ou debate prévios, em sessão presidida, na falta de um e outro, pelo juiz mais antigo e secretariada pelo mais novo. É eleito Presidente o juiz que obtiver o mínimo de nove votos e Vice-Presidente o que obtiver o mínimo de oito votos.

O Presidente tem as seguintes funções:

• Representa o Tribunal e assegura as suas relações com os demais órgãos e autoridades públicas;
• Recebe as candidaturas e as declarações de desistência dos candidatos a Presidente da República e preside à assembleia de apuramento geral da eleição presidencial e das eleições para o Parlamento Europeu;
• Preside às sessões plenárias do Tribunal;
• Preside à 1.ª e 2.ª Secções do Tribunal.

Compete ao Vice-Presidente:

• Presidir à 3.ª Secção do Tribunal.
• Substituir o Presidente nas suas faltas.

O Tribunal Constitucional funciona em sessões plenárias e por secções, consoante a natureza da matéria sobre a qual é chamado a pronunciar-se.

O Tribunal reúne ordinariamente, em regra todas as semanas, de acordo com a periodicidade definida no regimento interno e na calendarização fixada no início de cada ano judicial.

Cada juiz dispõe de um voto e o Presidente (ou o Vice-Presidente, quando o substitui) tem voto de qualidade; assim, em caso de empate na votação, considera-se vencedora a posição que tiver obtido o seu voto. Os juízes vencidos podem fazer declaração de voto.

O Ministério Público é representado no Tribunal Constitucional pelo Procurador-Geral da República, que pode delegar o exercício das suas funções no Vice-Procurador-Geral ou em Procuradores-Gerais-Adjuntos.

O local de funcionamento do Tribunal Constitucional é o Palácio Ratton, na Rua de "O Século", 111, em Lisboa. [[Ficheiro:Palácio Ratton.png|miniatura|O Palácio Ratton, sede do Tribunal Constitucional de Portugal]]