Talk:Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
This is the talk page for discussing improvements to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War article. This is not a forum for general discussion of the article's subject. |
Article policies
|
Find sources: Google (books · news · scholar · free images · WP refs) · FENS · JSTOR · TWL |
Archives: Index, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23Auto-archiving period: 8.5 days |
Warning: active arbitration remedies The contentious topics procedure applies to this article. This article is related to Armenia, Azerbaijan, or related conflicts, which is a contentious topic. Furthermore, the following rules apply when editing this article:
Editors who repeatedly or seriously fail to adhere to the purpose of Wikipedia, any expected standards of behaviour, or any normal editorial process may be blocked or restricted by an administrator. Editors are advised to familiarise themselves with the contentious topics procedures before editing this page. |
The subject of this article is controversial and content may be in dispute. When updating the article, be bold, but not reckless. Feel free to try to improve the article, but don't take it personally if your changes are reversed; instead, come here to the talk page to discuss them. Content must be written from a neutral point of view. Include citations when adding content and consider tagging or removing unsourced information. |
Please stay calm and civil while commenting or presenting evidence, and do not make personal attacks. Be patient when approaching solutions to any issues. If consensus is not reached, other solutions exist to draw attention and ensure that more editors mediate or comment on the dispute. |
A news item involving Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was featured on Wikipedia's Main Page in the In the news section on 27 September 2020. |
This level-5 vital article is rated C-class on Wikipedia's content assessment scale. It is of interest to multiple WikiProjects. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
To-do list for Second Nagorno-Karabakh War:
|
Belligerents
[edit]Vanezi Astghik, the belligerents section is for state players or similar - not just anybody that wants to throw an iron in the fire
. Just like the PPK, Syrian mercenaries and Armenian diaspora volunteers are not state players that would be listed as belligerents in the infobox - regardless of sources that say they were present. It is a miscategorisation. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:14, 22 June 2024 (UTC)
- @Cinderella157 I am not sure where you are quoting "state players or similar" from, but according to the military conflict infobox template: particular units, formations, or groups may be indicated if doing so improves reader understanding. So you were right to unlist Armenian diaspora volunteers because that refers to unrelated individual cases, not any kind of group. But the Syrian National Army is clearly its own group, and very relevant because its units were in the frontlines. Vanezi (talk) 18:19, 29 June 2024 (UTC)
- The infobox listed Syrian mercenaries, with sources to support this description even though the link was piped to Syrian National Army. The sourcing does not appear to support this piping. Furthermore, it as alleged that they were recruited by Turkey. What I was quoting was from my edit summary. Cinderella157 (talk) 22:25, 29 June 2024 (UTC)
- There are reliable sources confirming Syrian mercenaries from the Syrian National Army.
- Although Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey deny the use of mercenaries, researchers have amassed a considerable amount of photographic evidence, drawn from videos and photographs the fighters have posted online, which tells a different story.[1]
- According to sources within the Syrian National Army (SNA), the umbrella term for a group of opposition militias backed by Turkey, around 1,500 Syrians have so far been deployed to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in the southern Caucasus ... Shortly after conflict erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey sought to mobilize the SNA, sometimes called Turkey’s proxy army ... The first fighters were transferred in late September to southern Turkey and then flown from Gaziantep to Ankara, before being transferred to Azerbaijan on Sept. 25.[2]
- The only error was the mercenaries were bullet pointed under Azerbaijan. From what these sources confirm, the mercenaries should instead be under Turkey, and the "alleged" comment should be removed. Vanezi (talk) 16:41, 16 July 2024 (UTC)
- Turkey can only be listed as "alleged by Armenia" per community consensus at this RFC: [3], and another one later on, which also decided on Syrian mercenaries: [4] If you want to change that, start a new RFC to form a new community consensus. Grandmaster 13:18, 23 July 2024 (UTC)
- These are mercenaries. Whether they had previous service with the Syrian National Army does not change their status as mercenaries. Cinderella157 (talk) 23:42, 26 July 2024 (UTC)
- There is a strong consensus to keep Syrian mercenaries as belligerents. Vanezi (talk) 05:57, 9 August 2024 (UTC)
- There are reliable sources confirming Syrian mercenaries from the Syrian National Army.
- The infobox listed Syrian mercenaries, with sources to support this description even though the link was piped to Syrian National Army. The sourcing does not appear to support this piping. Furthermore, it as alleged that they were recruited by Turkey. What I was quoting was from my edit summary. Cinderella157 (talk) 22:25, 29 June 2024 (UTC)
Yerevantsi, please see this RFC. To change the consensus, we need to have another RFC. A single user cannot undo the consensus reached by the wider community. Grandmaster 09:21, 9 December 2024 (UTC)
Erdogan: "We entered Karabakh"
[edit]Leaving this here for the record. "We must be very strong so that Israel can't do these ridiculous things to Palestine. Just like we entered Karabakh, just like we entered Libya, we might do similar to them," Erdogan told a meeting of his ruling AK Party in his hometown of Rize. [5] --Երևանցի talk 07:39, 29 July 2024 (UTC)
- It is an ambiguous political statement. He did not say that Turkish army was in Karabakh. Entering could mean many things. The article also says "he did not spell out what sort of intervention he was suggesting", and that "Turkey has denied any direct role in Azerbaijan's military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, but said last year it was using "all means", including military training and modernisation, to support its close ally". Grandmaster 08:01, 29 July 2024 (UTC)
- It is reasonable to conclude that Erdogan was referring to a military intervention (entry, incursion, invasion). It is hard to assume that Turkey intends to invade Israel's cultural or spiritual life. Of course, we are talking about a military intervention. Ավետիսյան91 (talk) 14:16, 29 July 2024 (UTC)
- That's one interpretation. There can be others. You can see that the Reuters journalists are not certain "what sort of intervention he was suggesting". Grandmaster 14:51, 29 July 2024 (UTC)
- There could be other interpretations if the context of Erdogan's speech were different. However, if we are talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the possible entry of Turkey into Israel to help the Palestinians, there can be no other interpretation. Turkey will certainly not intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with an educational, scientific, or cultural entry. It is obvious that he means a military entry (invasion). Adding some more links: [6], [7]. Ավետիսյան91 (talk) 16:31, 29 July 2024 (UTC)
- I should also add that Israel interpreted Erdogan's speech as a threat of military invasion. Here is the link: "Erdogan is following in the footsteps of Saddam Hussein and threatening to attack Israel". Russia also responded to the military comments of the parties. Azerbaijan also commented on Erdogan's speech, naturally denying: "After Erdogan’s ‘just like we entered Karabakh’ speech, Baku claims no Turkish troops were involved". All possible sides interpret Erdogan's speech as a threat of military invasion in both Karabakh and Israel. Ավետիսյան91 (talk) 05:56, 30 July 2024 (UTC)
- It is still a matter of interpretation. He did not explicitly say that Turkey sent troops to Karabakh, and it is still generally accepted that Turkey provided support in 2020. Pretty much all sources reporting on this speech mention that. NYT that you quoted writes:
- I should also add that Israel interpreted Erdogan's speech as a threat of military invasion. Here is the link: "Erdogan is following in the footsteps of Saddam Hussein and threatening to attack Israel". Russia also responded to the military comments of the parties. Azerbaijan also commented on Erdogan's speech, naturally denying: "After Erdogan’s ‘just like we entered Karabakh’ speech, Baku claims no Turkish troops were involved". All possible sides interpret Erdogan's speech as a threat of military invasion in both Karabakh and Israel. Ավետիսյան91 (talk) 05:56, 30 July 2024 (UTC)
- There could be other interpretations if the context of Erdogan's speech were different. However, if we are talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the possible entry of Turkey into Israel to help the Palestinians, there can be no other interpretation. Turkey will certainly not intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with an educational, scientific, or cultural entry. It is obvious that he means a military entry (invasion). Adding some more links: [6], [7]. Ավետիսյան91 (talk) 16:31, 29 July 2024 (UTC)
- That's one interpretation. There can be others. You can see that the Reuters journalists are not certain "what sort of intervention he was suggesting". Grandmaster 14:51, 29 July 2024 (UTC)
- It is reasonable to conclude that Erdogan was referring to a military intervention (entry, incursion, invasion). It is hard to assume that Turkey intends to invade Israel's cultural or spiritual life. Of course, we are talking about a military intervention. Ավետիսյան91 (talk) 14:16, 29 July 2024 (UTC)
- “Just like we entered Karabakh, just like we entered Libya, we can do similar to them,” he said, referring to Turkish support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia last year and his country’s military intervention in Libya.
- Politico: Turkey supported Azerbaijan during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War against Armenia in 2020, though has long denied any direct involvement, and has deployed troops in Libya in support of the United Nations-recognized government since 2020.
- In any case, this is a primary source, and can only be quoted with attribution. Grandmaster 07:02, 30 July 2024 (UTC)
- That site you got is Armenian propaganda HeydarISm (talk) 07:13, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
- If there is a doubt regarding the interpretation then one option would be to add a direct quote. Alaexis¿question? 17:37, 29 July 2024 (UTC)
Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 17 September 2024
[edit]This edit request has been answered. Set the |answered= or |ans= parameter to no to reactivate your request. |
Assyrian Volunteers to the war Twitchi667726 (talk) 13:19, 17 September 2024 (UTC)
- Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. CMD (talk) 16:06, 17 September 2024 (UTC)
Foreigners fighting for Armenia
[edit]There were tons of foreign fighters from countries like Lebanon, Syria and Greece etc. fighting for the Armenians, noted by Russian newspapers and even by reports coming from the countries where the foreign mercenaries fighting for Armenia came from. We need to add foreign mercenaries for the Armenian belligerent section of the page. Reread the page where it talks about third party allegations. HeydarISm (talk) 07:21, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
- The belligerents section is for state players and sometimes for politically/ideologically organised groups - ie who are the warring sides. Mercenaries don't count wrt the infobox though if sufficiently significant, they might be mentioned in the body of the article. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:24, 1 October 2024 (UTC)
RfC on inclusion of Syrian mercenaries in infobox
[edit]
|
The RfC is whether to retain or remove Syrian mercenaries from the belligerents section of the infobox. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:58, 10 December 2024 (UTC)
See #Belligerents for preceeding discussion.
MilHist notified. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:01, 10 December 2024 (UTC)
- Case for removal Per MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE, the infobox is to summarise key facts from the article and is a supplement to the lead. We are advised that less is better and we shouldn't try to write the article in the infobox. Per the template doc, in an international conflict, the beligerent section is for the nations that participated in the conflict. An exception might include smaller groups if it
improves reader understanding
. The spirit and intent of the doc is that such inclusion would be exceptional.
- Discussions here and elsewhere (eg Russian invasion of Ukraine) affirms that we don't add nationals from various countries that have volunteered their services under this heading. The same reasonably applies to guns for hire. The mercenaries were reportedly provided by Turkey and, if anything, they are part of Turkey's alleged involvement. Consequently, they do not represent a separate belligerent to be represented as such in the infobox. Their inclusion can be seen as detail, which is not what the infobox is for.
- The body of the article makes quite limited mention of the mercenaries (that they accounted for 541 deaths out of 7,630 Azerbaijani soldiers). They are mentioned in two sentences in the section on military tactics attributed to a single source. Two other passing mentions relate to them being supplied by Turkey. The body of the article does not appear to establish that they are not of themself key or significant to the conflict. They are not mentioned in the lead. On the otherhand, the article very clearly establishes the significance of Turkey to the conflict.
- There is also an issue with (mis)representing the mercenaries under the flag of the Syrian opposition rather than being guns for hire with an allegiance bought and paid for.
- There is a strong P&G based argument for their removal from the infobox. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:58, 10 December 2024 (UTC)
- How come Syrian National Army being presented as Syrian mercenaries. Not going to vote here, whatsoever. But shouldn't be linked to Syrian National Army and shouldn't have the Syrian revolutionary flag if they're mercenaries. If they're the SNA, shouldn't be called mercenaries. Beshogur (talk) 06:54, 12 December 2024 (UTC)
- Agree, noting that sources refer to them as Syrian mercenaries. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:46, 13 December 2024 (UTC)
- How come Syrian National Army being presented as Syrian mercenaries. Not going to vote here, whatsoever. But shouldn't be linked to Syrian National Army and shouldn't have the Syrian revolutionary flag if they're mercenaries. If they're the SNA, shouldn't be called mercenaries. Beshogur (talk) 06:54, 12 December 2024 (UTC)
- Yeah, I think it would make sense. For the avoidance of doubt, they definitely should be mentioned elsewhere in the infobox, for example in Units involved section. Alaexis¿question? 15:30, 10 December 2024 (UTC)
- I agree that belligerents should only include state actors. Non-state actors could be mentioned, if needed, in other sections, for example, in Units involved, as suggested above. Grandmaster 15:51, 10 December 2024 (UTC)
- Comment. If the Syrian mercenaries are to be removed from belligerents, then it should be on the condition of Turkey being listed as a full belligerent. There are a great amount of sources confirming Turkish involvement, including providing the mercenaries. Erdogan has openly admitted Turkey was involved and compared NK to other wars that Turkey’s involvement is not questioned.[8][9][10][11][12] And the Syrian mercenaries should remain under units, as has already been suggested. Vanezi (talk) 18:39, 10 December 2024 (UTC)
- Turkey was definitely involved, but I think that we need stronger sources to include it as a belligerent. A few years have passed already so we should try to use sources that are more reliable than newspaper article. Note that the Nordic Monitor doesn't state it as fact that Turkey participated in the war but rather quotes Erdogan who might have his own reasons to play up the role of Turkey. Alaexis¿question? 20:43, 10 December 2024 (UTC)
- @Alaexis Academic peer reviewed source on top of what I have posted already:
- Calcara, Antonio; Gilli, Andrea; Gilli, Mauro; Marchetti, Raffaele; Zaccagnini, Ivan. Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare International Security. 46 (4): 130–171. "Turkish support included the provision of drones, electronic warfare units, aircraft for target acquisition, long-range artillery, skilled Turkish troops that operated these platforms, and the transportation of Syrian fighters to the theater of operation for ground combat."
- And another source:
- Simon Ostrovsky. How Azerbaijan Won the Karabakh War New Lines Magazine. "Ankara, which has been waging war in Syria for years, sent experienced military advisors to direct Baku’s war machine"
- Do you now agree that if mercenaries are to be removed from infobox, it should be on the condition of Turkey being listed as a full belligerent? Vanezi (talk) 18:21, 11 December 2024 (UTC)
- Thanks! Note that they still don't call Turkey a party to the conflict or a belligerent. I think that the Turkish support was important and would support mentioning it in the infobox if there is a good way to do it. Alaexis¿question? 21:19, 11 December 2024 (UTC)
- @Alaexis Turkey's mercenaries make it belligerent. The western mainstream sources state without ambiguity that these are Turkey's mercenaries, despite Turkey and Azerbaijan denying they even exist. The mercenaries have even been confirmed to have travelled on Turkish military transport aircraft
- American thinktank source states Turkish warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh is a weird mixture of tactics. On the one hand, Turkey sent in thousands of Syrian mercenaries whose salaries it pays. Most of them participated in the Syrian uprising against Assad’s regime over the previous decade under Islamic, mostly jihadi, organizations. Some may still hold on to their Salafi beliefs but have since become soldiers of fortune, fighting for the highest bidder. Some of them are fighting for Turkey in Syria; others were sent to Libya, and the rest are doing Turkey’s work in Nagorno-Karabakh.
- Turkey should not only be listed beyond doubt as a belligerent if the Syrian mercenaries are not being considered one of their own, the infobox is also very outdated in claiming Turkish involvement is only alleged and by just Armenia. This does not accurately reflect what the sources have written. Vanezi (talk) 05:49, 17 December 2024 (UTC)
- Thanks! Note that they still don't call Turkey a party to the conflict or a belligerent. I think that the Turkish support was important and would support mentioning it in the infobox if there is a good way to do it. Alaexis¿question? 21:19, 11 December 2024 (UTC)
- @Alaexis Academic peer reviewed source on top of what I have posted already:
- To list Turkey as a belligerent, it should be demonstrated that it is generally accepted to consider it a belligerent. So far the majority of reliable sources say that Turkey provided support to Azerbaijan. A few sources making the claim is not enough, and Erdogan is a primary source. We cannot make interpretations of primary sources. Most reliable sources reporting his speech mentioned that Turkey provided support. That includes the Reuters report that you quoted. Grandmaster 09:27, 11 December 2024 (UTC)
- Turkey was definitely involved, but I think that we need stronger sources to include it as a belligerent. A few years have passed already so we should try to use sources that are more reliable than newspaper article. Note that the Nordic Monitor doesn't state it as fact that Turkey participated in the war but rather quotes Erdogan who might have his own reasons to play up the role of Turkey. Alaexis¿question? 20:43, 10 December 2024 (UTC)
- Oppose There is no reason to remove Syrian mercenaries from the list of belligerants, especially if they made a contribution to the Azerbaijani side (which it seems that they have). The 541 deaths out of 7,630 deaths number, assuming this is true, is still a significant number of soldiers. The difference between nationals from different countries and the Syrian mercenaries is that the nationals from different countries were not significantly separated from the Ukrainian military apparatus, while the Syrian mercenaries were. Not to mention that there is support by the SNA leadership for the Turkish and Azerbaijani governments, not just the mercenaries.
- The discussion on the Russian invasion of Ukraine article doesn't necessarily apply to other conflicts, as there's a lot of articles where non-state actors are added to the beligerant infobox, such as the American Revolutionary War, the First Chechen War, the Second Chechen War, and even the First Nagorno-Karabakh war. Not a whole lot is said about the Chickasaw regarding the American Revolutionary war, and yet they are listed in the belligerants section.
- Also, it doesn't really matter that the SNA is a "part of Turkey's involvement". Because if it did, then they wouldn't be listed as a separate entity on the pages for the Syrian civil war and the 2024 Syrian opposition offensives (listed as the Syrian Interim Government). Can I has Cheezburger? (talk) 15:31, 11 December 2024 (UTC)
- Comment There is far far too much detail in this infobox for the average war article that should be in the main article. scope_creepTalk 12:12, 12 December 2024 (UTC)
- Agree. But this is one of several points. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:47, 13 December 2024 (UTC)
- Support. I agree that it is preferable to limit the belligerents to state actors, provided their direct involvement (physical presence in battles) is an established fact. We have no evidence that the SNA leadership (which is not a state actor, at least not in 2020) voiced support for Azerbaijan. Even if their troops were involved in the battles (a claim that, four years after the war, remains speculative and is consistently framed with terms like "allegedly" or "presumably") this contribution does not make them a belligerent in this respect. North Korea, a state actor, has made its support for Russia in the Russian invasion of Ukraine unmistakably clear and has reportedly sent regular troops to participate in combat. Yet, we do not consider North Korea a belligerent in the corresponding article. Parishan (talk) 14:03, 16 December 2024 (UTC)
MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE
[edit]This is a such a weak excuse.
This has nothing to do with this, and it doesn't even violate this.
This oversimplification is misleading.
that's were the battles took place, not only in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan gains control of 73% of disputed territory
This is even worse. The supposed "disputed territory" is Nagorno-Karabakh right? Not gonna argue that it's de jure Azerbaijan or not, most of the fighting and capture of the territory took place outisde of the "disputed territory", which is basically misleading people.
@Cinderella157:. Beshogur (talk) 06:46, 12 December 2024 (UTC)
- @Cinderella157: give answers instead of reporting me falsely of 1RR. Beshogur (talk) 11:10, 12 December 2024 (UTC)
- Also I don't even know where you came with the 73%.
In total, Azerbaijan regained control of 73% of the disputed territory, including the territory captured in Nagorno-Karabakh.
while the source says:Noyabrın 10-da imzalanmış üçtərəfli bəyanata uyğun olaraq, Ağdam rayonu Azərbaycana təhvil verilib. Bununla da rayonun işğal edilmiş 73 faiz ərazisi azad olunub.
which literally says something like "73% occupied part of Aghdam District got liberated". Beshogur (talk) 11:52, 12 December 2024 (UTC)
- The war is centred on Nagorno-Karabakh. The infobox map details the locations. In the presence of the map, further details on the location are redundant.
- The territorial changes to be reported in the infobox are what happened at the end of the day when the dust settled (ie after the ceasefire). The distinction between pre and post the ceasefire is nuance/detail for which the infobox is unsuited. How many cities/towns/villages changed hands is definitely detail and not an established criterion for measuring territorial changes (ie area). Indeed, it is not a measure of territory per se. The disputed territory is not just Nagorno-Karabakh but territory that changed hands in the first war. Again, this is indicated by the lead image map. There is a section in the article for Territorial changes. The key take-away from that is the proportion of territory that changed hands. The proportion is consistent with the map which also shows where this occurred. Writing detail of where this occurred is redundant in the presence of the map and omitting the key take-away (the proportion) is a significant omission.
- Per MOS:INFOBOXPURPOSE, the infobox is not the place for detail or nuance. That is better dealt with in prose. We don't try to write the article in the infobox. Less is better. There is nothing misleading about the information you reverted.
- You would now dispute what the source reporting the 73% states:
Noyabrın 10-da Azərbaycan Prezidenti, Ermənistanın baş naziri və Rusiya Prezidenti münaqişə zonasında atəşin və bütün hərbi əməliyyatların tam dayandırılması barədə bəyanat imzalayıblar. Bəyanata əsasən 2020-ci il dekabrın 1-dək Kəlbəcər, Ağdam və Laçın rayonları Azərbaycana qaytarılmalıdır.
Bəyanata uyğun olaraq, noyabrın 20-də Ağdam rayonu Azərbaycana təhvil verilib.
Bununla da rayonun işğal edilmiş 73 faiz ərazisi, o cümlədən Ağdam şəhəri azad olunub.
- The text is written in three paragraphs. The first para is defining districts in the occupied region impacted by the ceasefire anf handovers. The second tells us when the Aghdam district was handed over. The third tells us the proportion of the occupied (disputed) territory that were handed over (including the city of Aghdam). Visually (from the map), the area recovered by Azerbaijan is between two-thirds and three-quaters of the pre-war disputed area and is consistent with the 73% figure. The pre-war area of Aghdam in dispute was 77%.[13] While WP is not a source, it tends to support the 73% being the total proportion of the area gained.
- Perhaps the source is ambiguous and your interpretation is correct. However, this source reports that 72.4% of the disputed area was gained by Azerbaijan, which is essentially the same. We can amend the source in the body of the article. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:48, 13 December 2024 (UTC)
- I think we should make a distinction between the territory of the former NKAO, and the 7 districts surrounding the Karabakh region. The latter had no Armenian population, and was recognized as occupied territory by the UNSC. Also, the source in Azerbaijani says that Azerbaijan returned 73% of the Aghdam district. Grandmaster 10:41, 13 December 2024 (UTC)
Azerbaijan is between two-thirds and three-quaters of the pre-war disputed area and is consistent with the 73% figure. The pre-war area of Aghdam in dispute was 77%.[13] While WP is not a source, it tends to support the 73% being the total proportion of the area gained
that's only your assumption. The 73% comes from the Azerbaijani ministry, which is most likely correct. There is not much difference between both numbers 4%. Also what do they consider occupied? It was full of no mans land in between. As Grandmaster told, it's about Aghdam, so you're wrong here. Beshogur (talk) 11:29, 13 December 2024 (UTC)- You're doing it again. Changing to Republic of Artsakh, doesn't change anything. It's not even a legal territory. You probably don't even want to admit that Karabakh is a territory of Azerbaijan. Also nice blogpost source btw, making everything more vague. Beshogur (talk) 12:42, 16 December 2024 (UTC)
- The 2020 war occurred in the Republic of Artsakh, which *included* most of the surrounding occupied territories and Nagorno-Karabakh. There is nothing controversial about this. Vanezi (talk) 05:47, 17 December 2024 (UTC)
- Not according to the international law. Legally those territories are part of Azerbaijan, and we should mind WP:NPOV. Grandmaster 10:27, 17 December 2024 (UTC)
- Ok, we should change the lead to
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was an armed conflict in 2020 that took place in the Republic of Artsakh.
Beshogur (talk) 11:40, 17 December 2024 (UTC)
- The 2020 war occurred in the Republic of Artsakh, which *included* most of the surrounding occupied territories and Nagorno-Karabakh. There is nothing controversial about this. Vanezi (talk) 05:47, 17 December 2024 (UTC)
I think this should also be put to vote, rather than changed unilaterally by a single user. Grandmaster 09:20, 16 December 2024 (UTC)
- @Grandmaster: There are many errors in this user's edits here. This user says Azerbaijan took 72% of the disputed region. Supposedly the disputed region is Nagorno-Karabakh, not the Armenian occupied territories. This user's version is going away more and more from Armenian occupation thing. Soon I wonder this article claims there was no occupation at all. I like how it's even removed from the lead only called the occupied territories. Occupied by whom? Aliens? Beshogur (talk) 12:51, 16 December 2024 (UTC)
- That is why I think the infobox content should be discussed and agreed at talk first. Unilateral changes are not good, Wikipedia works by consensus. Indeed, the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be a location. Location should be a particular geographic region, in this case Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding districts. Grandmaster 14:32, 16 December 2024 (UTC)
Dubious tag
[edit]Beshogur, you have tagged disputed territory in the territory section of the infobox with being dubious. The territory of the Republic of Artsakh at the start of the war is the locus of the dispute. It is the territory that has been disputed in the war. The infobox image (map) clearly establishes the boundary of the area that has been disputed in the war. Your post above (Occupied by whom? Aliens?
) is an argument of Reductio ad absurdum. There is no reasonable reason to tag this as being dubious or even unclear. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:44, 18 December 2024 (UTC)
Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 17 December 2024
[edit]This edit request has been answered. Set the |answered= or |ans= parameter to no to reactivate your request. |
Give proof that on the Azerbaijani side fought syrian mercenaries. Ut it should be clear proof, not based on stories 2003:EC:8F18:1301:8498:F52F:CDAA:5BD (talk) 20:55, 17 December 2024 (UTC)
Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Current article is sourced to the BBC and Foreign Policy - change would require better sourcing. PianoDan (talk) 23:14, 17 December 2024 (UTC)
See RfC above. Cinderella157 (talk) 00:42, 18 December 2024 (UTC)
- Wikipedia controversial topics
- Wikipedia In the news articles
- C-Class level-5 vital articles
- Wikipedia level-5 vital articles in History
- C-Class vital articles in History
- C-Class Armenian articles
- High-importance Armenian articles
- WikiProject Armenia articles
- C-Class Artsakh articles
- High-importance Artsakh articles
- WikiProject Artsakh articles
- C-Class Azerbaijan articles
- High-importance Azerbaijan articles
- WikiProject Azerbaijan articles
- C-Class International relations articles
- Mid-importance International relations articles
- WikiProject International relations articles
- C-Class Limited recognition articles
- Low-importance Limited recognition articles
- WikiProject Limited recognition articles
- C-Class military history articles
- C-Class Russian, Soviet and CIS military history articles
- Russian, Soviet and CIS military history task force articles
- C-Class Post-Cold War articles
- Post-Cold War task force articles
- Wikipedia pages with to-do lists
- Wikipedia requests for comment