Wikipedia

Five Fingers of Tibet

The Five Fingers of Tibet (Chinese: 西藏的五指; pinyin: Xīzàng de wǔzhǐ) was a Chinese territorial claim to the Himalayan region bordering India attributed to Mao Zedong. It considers Tibet to be China's right hand palm, with five fingers on its periphery: Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and North-East Frontier Agency (now known as Arunachal Pradesh) that are considered China's responsibility to "liberate".[1][2][3] The policy however has never been discussed in official Chinese public statements and is now dormant,[4] but concerns have often been raised over its possible continued existence or revival.

Five Fingers of Tibet
Chinese西藏的五指
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinXīzàng de wǔ zhǐ

Background

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Imperial China claimed suzerainty over Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan as an extension of its claim over Tibet.[5][unreliable source?] These claims were asserted by the Chinese amban in Tibet in 1908, who wrote to the Nepalese authorities that Nepal and Tibet, "being united like brothers under the auspices of China, should work in harmony for mutual good." He suggested the "blending of five colours" representing China, Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan as part of his program to assert the Chinese claim in the face of British opposition.[6][unreliable source?] On 15 November 1939, the founding chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong termed Bhutan and Nepal as China's tributary states.

After having inflicted military defeats on China, the imperialist countries forcibly took from her a large number of states tributary to China, as well as a part of her own territory. Japan appropriated Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores, and Port Arthur; England took Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hongkong; France seized Annam; even a miserable little country like Portugal took Macao from us. At the same time that they took away part of her territory, the imperialists obliged China to pay enormous indemnities. Thus heavy blows were struck against the vast feudal empire of China.[7][a]

— Mao Zedong

Emergence in the 20th century

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The "Five Fingers of Tibet" policy has been widely attributed to Mao's speeches in the 1940s,[8][2][9] but has never been discussed in official Chinese public statements.[4] This construct considered Tibet to be the palm of China's right hand, with Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and North-East Frontier Agency (now known as Arunachal Pradesh) being its five fingers. In 1954, Chinese officers in Tibet claimed that they would "liberate Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh, and the NEFA, which were wrongfully being held by the Indian imperialists."[10]: 55 

In 1954, the Chinese government published a book called "A Brief History of Modern China" for school students, which included a map showing the territories allegedly taken by "imperialist powers" between 1840 and 1919, terming them as "portions of China that must be reclaimed." This map included Ladakh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and the entire Northeast India.[4] This was noted in the memoirs of Indian diplomat Triloki Nath Kaul who was serving in Peking (now known as Beijing) at that time.[2] Scholar B. S. K. Grover said that this map was a "serious reflection of Peking's ambitions" and not mere propaganda or "idle-boasting".[4]

The claims over the "five fingers" were asserted "emphatically and frequently" from 1958 to 1961 over the Peking and Lhasa radio systems.[10]: 96 [b] During a mass meeting in Lhasa in July 1959, Chinese lieutenant general Zhang Guohua said: "Bhutanese, Sikkimese and Ladakhis form a united family in Tibet. They have always been subject to Tibet and to the great motherland of China. They must once again be united and taught the communist doctrine."[4][11][c] Alarmed, Bhutan closed off its border with China and shut off all trade and diplomatic contacts.[11] It also established formal defence arrangements with India.[15]

Relevance to 21st century policy

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The policy is officially dormant now. However, fears have been expressed regarding its revival.[16][17]

After the 2017 China–India border standoff at Doklam, an article in Qunzhong (a magazine run by the CCP's Jiangsu provincial party standing committee) quoted Mao Zedong's "five fingers" construct.[18] The article was contributed by a researcher from Nanjing University. It alleges that India's covert support to the Tibetan independence movement stems from the fact that it was impossible to fully control the "five fingers" without the "palm", Tibet.[18] It adds that as China's investments, trade, and economic relations with these regions increase, Chinese influence will overtake that of India and neutralize Indian control to a greater extent.[18]

Lobsang Sangay, the leader of the Central Tibetan Administration, linked the policy with the border disputes between China and India.[19][20] Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury, Seshadri Chari, and M. M. Khajooria (former Director General of Police of Jammu and Kashmir) have voiced similar concerns.[21][22][23]

According to commentator Saurav Jha, the "five fingers" policy arises from the historical geography of the Himalayas which allows bi-directional territorial claims between Tibet and the southern regions. This leads to tensions between the trans-Himalayan powers which is "ultimately tempered by a balance of military capability," and is the reason behind the longstanding Sino-Indian border dispute.[24]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ The official version—in Mao's Selected Works, Vol III—omits mentions of Korea, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Annam.
  2. ^ The author does not cite any source.
  3. ^ The statement attributed to Zhang Guohua (Old spelling: Chang Kuow-Hua or Chang Kuo-Hua), the head of the Chinese Mission in Tibet, made in a public meeting in Lhasa on 17 July 1959. This passage was apparently deleted from the version reported in China Today, but it was reported by George N. Patterson, the Kalimpong correspondent of The Daily Telegraph and also published in the Hindustan Times.[12][13][14]

References

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  1. ^ "India, China and the Nathu La India, China and the Nathu La Understanding Beijing's Larger Strategy towards the Region" (PDF). Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies. Retrieved 2020-06-29.
  2. ^ a b c Haidar, Suhasini (18 June 2020). "History, the standoff, and policy worth rereading". The Hindu.
  3. ^ Theys, Sarina (25 January 2018). "Running hot and cold: Bhutan-India-China relations". London School of Economics.
  4. ^ a b c d e Grover, B. S. K. (1974). Sikkim and India: Storm and Consolidation. Jain Brothers. pp. 152–153 – via archive.org.
  5. ^ Jain, Girilal (1960). "Threat to India's Integrity". Panchsheela and After: A Re-Appraisal of Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of the Tibetan Insurrection. Asia Publishing House. p. 158 – via archive.org.
  6. ^ Jain, Girilal (1959). "Consequences of Tibet". India meets China in Nepal. Asia Publishing House. pp. 105–106 – via archive.org.
  7. ^ Schram, Stuart R. (1969). "China and the Underdeveloped Countries". The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Praeger Publishers. p. 375. ISBN 978-0-275-67073-3 – via archive.org.
  8. ^ Muni, S. D. (2009). "The Nehruvian Phase: Ideology Adjusts with Realpolitik". India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension. Foundation Books. p. 31. ISBN 9788175968530.
  9. ^ Srivastava, Sanjay (19 June 2020). "India-China Face-off : क्या है चीन की 'फाइव फिंगर्स ऑफ तिब्बत स्ट्रैटजी', जिससे भारत को रहना होगा अलर्ट" (in Hindi). News18 India.
  10. ^ a b Belfiglio, Valentine John (1970). The Foreign Relations of India with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal Between 1947–1967: An Analytical Framework for the Study of Big Power-Small Power Relations (PhD). University of Oklahoma.
  11. ^ a b Benedictus, Brian (2 August 2014), "Bhutan and the Great Power Tussle", The Diplomat, archived from the original on 22 December 2015
  12. ^ Moraes, Frank (1960), The Revolt in Tibet, New York: Macmillan, p. 193 – via archive.org
  13. ^ Palat, Madhavan K., ed. (1984), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 51 (1–31 August 1959), Oxford University Press, p. 452, note 82
  14. ^ The Eastern Economist, Volume 33, Issues 1-13, 1959, p. 228, Well, Mr. Chang ... seems to have delivered a speech in the mountain fastnesses of Tibet which had a passage (deleted from 'China Today') reading: "Bhutanese, Sikkimise and Ladakhis formed a united family in Tibet; they have been subjects of Tibet and the great motherland of China and must once again be united and taught the Communist doctrine". This has been duly reported in "The Daily Telegraph" abroad, and most people in Delhi will agree is unlikely to have been invented; it must have been printed in a Tibetan paper avidly read in Kalimpong.
  15. ^ Sandeep Bharadwaj (9 August 2017), "Doklam may bring Bhutan closer to India", livemint, archived from the original on 16 August 2017
  16. ^ Bradsher, Henry S. (1969). "Tibet Struggles to Survive". Foreign Affairs. 47 (4): 752. doi:10.2307/20039413. ISSN 0015-7120. JSTOR 20039413.
  17. ^ Jha, Purushottam (19 June 2020). "China – A desperate state to change the narratives and contexts". The Times of India.
  18. ^ a b c Litao, Liu (26 September 2017). "重新审视"印度象"". Qunzhong. Archived from the original on 16 July 2020.
  19. ^ Basu, Nayanima (17 October 2017). "'Doklam is part of China's expansionist policy'". Business Line.
  20. ^ Siddiqui, Maha (18 June 2020). "Ladakh is the First Finger, China is Coming After All Five: Tibet Chief's Warning to India". News18.
  21. ^ Khajooria, M. M. (5 June 2020). "Maos' open palm & its five fingers". State Times.
  22. ^ Chowdhury, Adhir Ranjan (17 June 2020). "Chinese intrusion in Ladakh has created a challenge that must be met". The Indian Express.
  23. ^ Chari, Seshadri (12 June 2020). "70 yrs on, India's Tibet dilemma remains. But 4 ways Modi can achieve what Nehru couldn't". ThePrint.
  24. ^ Jha, Saurav (30 May 2020). "India must stand firm". Deccan Herald.
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