Talk:1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash

The article states that a 120m diameter circular piece of land was bought by the army corps of engineers. However, from satellite footage, it clearly shows that the piece of untouched land is significantly smaller, approximate 20-30 meters in diameter. So what's going on there? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A00:4820:44F0:400:57E8:FD0F:3B5E:FCDC (talk) 09:19, 25 September 2022 (UTC)Reply

The article mentions that five of six arming devices activated, but then also states that the fourth arming device did not activate. Were there a total of four, or six, arming devices?

69.143.71.141 (talk) 04:37, 23 May 2009 (UTC)Reply

Yeah, this stub article needs work. Have fixed the immediate problem. Socrates2008 (Talk) 07:51, 23 May 2009 (UTC)Reply

Who said that 5 arming devices were activated including the charging caps? Is that in the book, and what source did the book use? Sounds like an exaggeration to me. Paul Studier (talk) 19:41, 12 July 2009 (UTC)Reply

Thank you Socrates2008 for the internet accessible reference. I added the military's side, so what one believes will be determined by whether one has more confidence in Daniel Ellsberg or the Military. Paul Studier (talk) 23:58, 13 July 2009 (UTC)Reply

It appears evidence is now available that clarifies that there were four stages http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24183879 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.7.195.195 (talk) 09:59, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

This article says the weapons were 24 megatons, which two of the sources debunk and trace the error to a publication in 1961 that probably omitted a dash or a decimal point. This figure has been used ever since, erroneously, in reference to the Goldsboro incident. 24 mt caught my eye because that number is far larger than the vast majority of weapons developed by the United States. The only deployed weapon of that size was the Mk41 of 25 mt yield. The Mk39 involved in this incident is stated by various sources to have a yield of 2-4, 3.5, or 3.8 mt.

I'm removing the 24 mt figure from the text as the weapon named is not of that yield.--SEWalk (talk) 22:38, 22 January 2010 (UTC)Reply

How could the aircraft have started to break up at 10,000 feet, when it was still intact as the crew ejected at 9,000 feet? Whoop whoop pull up ^{Bitching Betty | Averted crashes} 21:35, 1 October 2011 (UTC)Reply

The Army Corps of Engineers purchased a 400 foot circular easement over the buried component. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill determined the buried depth of the secondary component to be 180 feet, plus or minus 10 feet. So its still there today in 2012??? --RThompson82 (talk) 00:07, 28 May 2012 (UTC)Reply

Yes. The Google Earth view now (2022) is exactly as described in the article. 2001:8003:E48C:E601:C09:E58D:8AC8:99C2 (talk) 12:30, 8 April 2022 (UTC)Reply

Re: "...the pilot's safe/arm switch was the only one of the six arming devices on the bomb that prevented detonation." Only Dr. Strangelove’s pilot saddles up and rides the bomb down, so "his" switch was in the flight station, with the bombardier's in the lower-deck battle station. The W39 was engineered to be compact, so it is entirely possible that the two switches functioned together to activate a single one within the bomb. Nuclear command and control simply redirects to command and control, and Go code to code word while nuclear football makes no reference to a requirement for TWO officers acting independently to first confirm receipt of a valid GO CODE and then to act independently to arm a nuclear weapon. Nor can I find any reference to such a doctrine today. that makes it hard to say it was engineered around. —Pawyilee (talk) 07:06, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

• This interview of the man who disarmed the bombs, Air Force EOD officer Jack ReVelle, seems to indicate that the arm/safe switch was on the back of the bomb. I find that hard to believe and think it was in the cockpit. Even so, it might make sense to check sources to see where this switch actually was. Mark Turner (talk) 14:18, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Re: "The Pentagon claims ... that two arming mechanisms had not activated." — the pilot's and bombardier's switches, in the aircraft. —Pawyilee (talk) 07:26, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

• • Read the 8-Day Dig, and it is obvious there was one arm/safe switch in each bomb, even if there were two switches in the aircraft from which they had separated; which should have been the only way to activate them, but equally obvious that wasn't true. —Pawyilee (talk) 12:13, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

The Okalahoma State University has a great interview with the man who disarmed the bombs, former Air Force officer Jack ReVelle. This site has better photographs as well, none of which are credited, unfortunately. A much better photo of the bomb can be found here on the Legend of the Buried Bomb of Faro website. This photo matches the one on the above OK State website about ReVelle, leading me to believe it is the work of ReVelle. Regardless, it appears the photo is a match of the one currently illustrating the article, only much higher resolution, and could potentially replace it for that reason. Mark Turner (talk) 14:25, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

• • I have added this photograph to Wikimedia Commons as it is listed on the OK State story as being a U.S. Air Force photograph. It is reasonable to assume that the photograph is indeed a work of the USAF as civilians would not be permitted near a fully-intact, nearly-fully-armed nuclear weapon. I will upload a detail version for illustrating the article. Mark Turner (talk) 15:34, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Reply
• Another interview with Jack ReVelle. Mark Turner (talk) 15:48, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

The Oklahoma State University interview has a link to Jack ReVelle's own notes taken during the bomb recovery operation. Mark Turner (talk) 15:09, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

I am confused. The bomb which was apparently armed had deployed a 100 foot retard" parachute. It should therefore have been the bomb which was not buried. It would presumably have been recovered intact. But the article does not say that. It says that the "second bomb" - which was the armed bomb - was deeply buried. Yet that could not have been the bomb which had the parachute.203.184.41.226 (talk) 20:11, 21 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Thanks for pointing that out. Any better now? Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:54, 22 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Looking at the current revision it's still confusing. Here's how my reading of the source material shows things:

• Bomb #1 deploys parachute and lands relatively intact. It's safe/arm switch is in "safe" position. ReVelle says with the switch in that position nothing will happen. He turns his attention to the second bomb.
• Bomb #2 is found deep in muck, shattered into pieces. It's safe/arm switch is in "arm" position, a find so ominous that it causes these skilled and seasoned EOD team members to become speechless. ReVelle can't explain why the second bomb did not detonate.

The current revision of the article seems to indicate the seconb bomb's safe/arm switch was in "safe" position, which is not what ReVelle has repeatedly said. I will adjust the article accordingly.

Incidentally, the Orange County Register story of Dec. 2012 is one of the best accountings of this incident, outside of Dobson's book on the subject. I highly recommend it. Mark Turner (talk) 14:35, 22 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

I've read through many of these sources and have to say I'm still somewhat confused about which bombs went through which arming stages. I've read conflicting accounts. Was the parachute bomb through all its stages except the safe/arm switch? Had the buried bomb completed its stages, including the safe/arm switch? Does anyone have any definitive sources for this information? Mark Turner (talk) 15:36, 22 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Actually, it looks like the Hansen Documents on the ibiblio site has the most detailed informaton on the bombs and the stages that completed. Does someone want to integrate this into the article? Mark Turner (talk) 16:11, 22 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Yes, agree this source certainly spells it out very clearly. The ambiguity appears to stem from the fact that both bombs had switches that activated, but the parachute one got further into its arming sequence as it dropped slower, thus allowing the timer-based switch to arm? So it was the parachute bomb that had only one switch preventing the weapon from firing. Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:43, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

But having read this again, I suspect we may still have a problem:

"When I got to the site, we found the parachute had deployed on one bomb," ReVelle said at the campus event. "The parachute caught in a tree, and the bomb was intact and standing upright. When I checked it I found the arm/safe switch was still in the safe position, so it had not begun the arming process."

"That was not the case with the second bomb. Its parachute failed to open and it struck the ground at about 700 miles per hour", ReVelle said.

ReVelle and his crew began digging to recover the second bomb. After five days, they found parts of the bomb and the crucial arm/safe switch. "Until my death I will never forget hearing my sergeant say, ‘Lieutenant, we found the arm/safe switch,’" ReVelle said. "And I said, ‘Great.’ He said, ‘Not great. It’s on arm."

Later tests determined the second bomb had gone through five of six steps toward detonation, ReVelle said.

Socrates2008 (Talk) 13:07, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Why exactly are we according so much weight to The Guardian's article about the account in Schlosser's book? According to people who have actually been in the nuclear business, it's overblown hysteria-mongering. I know there's a lot of a "they won't tell you the truth" attitude about stuff like this but we should be sourcing to only the absolute cream of the crop of sources on things like this, not the work of one 'investigative journalist' who may well have an axe to grind. At the very least, we need to provide additional coverage of the official statements that the bomb was safe in comparsion, instead of the current phrasing of the article which very much gives an air of "of course they claimed it was save but this brave investigative journalist has revealed the truth, Nukes Are Bad m'kay!". Also, I've trimmed several self-published sources from the article - two Lulu-published books and one that was sourced to a document on Dropbox(!). - The Bushranger _{One ping only} 21:56, 22 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

• Ok, Bushranger, this is Wikipedia. You know you can't get away with "according to people who have actually been..." and not cite your sources. You are welcome and encouraged to add your own but to parachute in here with an apparent axe to grind yourself is uncool. If you see a problem with the article, add your changes and show your work. Whining is not needed. Mark Turner (talk) 00:46, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply
• Now, to address your concern about Scholosser's POV, I see all of one quote from him and the rest of the information coming from that article quotes Sandia Labs nuclear expert Parker Jones's declassified 1969 report. I think it's safe to say that Jones knew what he was talking about so your concern is unfounded. Mark Turner (talk) 00:46, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply
• I concede your point about Lulu published works. However, the Dropbox link to ReVelle's notes was included in the Oklahoma State article on ReVelle. After studying Wikipedia's self-published guidelines this particular information meets the criteria for inclusion. Mark Turner (talk) 01:13, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply
• I am removing your POV tag as you have not adequately explained your reasoning for including it. There are DoD sources professing the safety of the bomb as well as sources that contradict this. If you see further issues, please let me know. Mark Turner (talk) 01:23, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

"A [US DOD representative said] that the bomb was unarmed and could not explode.[9] Former military analyst Daniel Ellsberg has claimed to have seen highly classified documents indicating that its safe/arm switch was the only one of the six arming devices on the bomb that prevented detonation.[1][9] Confirmation of this suspicion came in 2013 with the release of new information under the Freedom of Information Act.[10]"

Ellsberg makes a claim, which is later called a suspicion. And no matter how many arming devices there were, or however many functioned properly, they were 100% successful at preventing detonation. The juxtaposition of these comments implies that the DOD representative was making a misleading statement, which is not the case. Frankly, this entire paragraph is problematic, but perhaps:

"The [US DOD] reported that the bomb was unarmed and could not explode.[9] [Ellsberg] claimed, based on classified documents to which he had access, that one of six arming devices prevented detonation[1][9]. Ellsberg's claim that was confirmed upon the release of new information about the incident in 2013.[10]"

Below:

"Schlosser writes that "The US government has consistently tried to withhold information from the American people in order to prevent questions being asked about our nuclear weapons policy," he said. "We were told there was no possibility of these weapons accidentally detonating, yet here's one that very nearly did."[10]"

Scholosser's opinion of the U.S. governments information classification and nuclear weapons policy is irrelevant. Leave it in the reference if people want to follow it. Atrobinson (talk) 02:01, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Multiple safety devices which failed, contrary to claims at the time; long-held suspicions that the safety mechanisms had not worked as designed were confirmed this month with the declassification of a 50-year old report. These suspicions and analysis, which have subsequently been proven true, are perhaps now less important than the facts themselves, but there's still a story to tell around the 50-year suppression of these facts. Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:32, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Socrates2008: There may well be material for another article on the systematic failure of the U.S. government to reveal the details of its classified weapons programs, or of nuclear weapons systems safety, but this does not seem to be the place--and the entire "five out of six didn't work as designed" is misleading emphasis: the safety systems as a whole worked as designed and the weapons did not detonate. Furthermore, the "Schlosser writes..." paragraph remains irrelevant to the body of the article. Atrobinson (talk) 11:45, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

The redundancies in the safety systems largely failed, hence the reason this information was kept secret. The failures were further demonstrated at Palomares and Thule, where it was found that fire compromised the bomb switches. Hence development started on new permissive action links, and insensitive munitions. So I think you're missing the point. Socrates2008 (Talk) 12:32, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Atrobinson: you misunderstand what happened. The "five out of six" or "three out of four" steps are not safety systems or failsafes but are in actuality part of the detonation process. From my reading of the source material, only safety system on the MK 39 was the safe/arm switch(s). While it's true the first bomb's switch was found in safe position, the second's switch was found in arm position (at least one of them, anyway. ReVelle seems to say there was one but Hensen seemed to indicate two). Thus, it can be truthfully said that the second bomb's safety system failed. Fortunately, the detonation process did not complete for other reasons. Mark Turner (talk) 13:35, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

I've rewritten the FOIA sentence to clarify what was discovered. I will also remove Schlosser's quote. Mark Turner (talk) 13:35, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

"The Pentagon claimed at the time that there was no chance of an explosion and that two arming mechanisms had not activated. A United States Department of Defense spokesperson told United Press International reporter Donald May that the bomb was unarmed and could not explode.[9]"

This seems redundant, but that is stylistic. I withdraw my NPOV objection. With these edits I believe the article is factual and does not place inappropriate emphasis on either an apologetic or hostile interpretation of the event. It is not clear to me whether I should remove the tag or one of the authors/primary editors should remove the tag.Atrobinson (talk) 14:27, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Removed NPOV tag. Thanks for your input, Atrobinson. It helps to make a better article. Mark Turner (talk) 16:20, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

MH Maggelet, aka Michael H. Maggelet and author of "Bombs Over Goldsboro" (currently cited as reference 2) in his commentary of March 2 at 8:28am gives a detailed explanation of why there was no danger of a nuclear explosion from either bomb, which hopefully may be read at: Part 2: In 1961, wisecracking Jack ReVelle defused two nuclear bombs that landed on U.S. soil.

—Pawyilee (talk) 15:04, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

• Good stuff, Pawyilee. Maggelet seems to know what he's talking about. I would suggest we reference his book more than we have. Mark Turner (talk) 16:07, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply
  • Actually, it does not appear that Mr. Maggelet's book is cited anywhere in this article. Anyone want to take this on? Mark Turner (talk) 16:15, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply
    • D'oh! Never mind. Maggelet's book is self-published at Lulu. Damn these experts and their vanity presses! Mark Turner (talk) 16:18, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply
      • That's the fly in this ointment - unfortunatly a lot of stuff like this can only get published through "vanity presses", because "regular" publishers aren't interested in non-sensational things. If Maggelet is considered an established expert in his field, though, WP:SPS would still allow for him to be cited, I believe. - The Bushranger _{One ping only} 03:03, 24 September 2013 (UTC)Reply
      • Darn those experts and their 35 years experience in the nuclear weapons field. Oskins worked on the Mark 15, Mk 17, Mk 21, Mk 36, Mk 39 warhead, Mk 39 bomb, Mk 53 warhead, Mk 53 bomb, and B61. Maggelet worked on the B43, B57, B61, W69/AGM-69A SRAM, and B83. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2600:8807:8300:CC00:C857:A4F4:3912:DE9C (talk) 14:01, 9 March 2017 (UTC)Reply

There appear to be at least three sources worth considering:

• the initial book "Kill and Overkill" by Dr. Ralph Lapp which says on 127 that five out of six safety devices on the warhead had failed.
• the actual FOIA document "GOULDSBORO REVISITED or HOW I LEARNED TO MISTRUST THE H-BOMB or TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT" which says that Lapp's report lacked accuracy and objectivity, pointed out it was a bomb not a warhead, with four rather than six safety devices, but that a single safe/arm switch had been the only measure that survived.
• Whatever document this blogspot cite references [1] which gives an accounting of the various safety devices. It says that the switch on the second bomb showed "arm" but didn't. More to the point, it says that the second bomb was the object of the controversy; it also denies that it was anywhere near activation.

What's strange of course is that I'm left wondering if the switch that showed "arm" is the exact switch that stopped the bomb from going off according to the recent news reports. And whether the other measures would have stopped explosion or not. But I think the article needs some revision to avoid giving the impression that bomb #1 was the one at issue (not sure #2 was definitely the one, but I don't see why #1 is) Wnt (talk) 22:43, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

• Welcome to our conundrum! :) There are many conflicting accounts and it's difficult to sort out whom to trust. In ReVelle's interviews he states the second bomb's arm switch was activated. Hensen says it was partially activated, and Michael H. Maggelet says in his comment on the OC Register story that an AEC review found it not to be armed after all. I'm inclined to wonder if ReVelle's recollection is clouded by 50+ years of silence or perhaps the various reporters have misquoted him. Hensen seems like a credible source and his vast collection of FOIA documents are available for review but the cost of the whole collection on CD is $350. If anyone can find links to the particular official documents that would be a wonderful way to clear this up. Mark Turner (talk) 23:46, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply
• Another thing to consider is that since the second bomb disintegrated on impact and its parts scattered into the muck it may be very difficult or impossible to determine what caused the detonation process to fail. I believe I read that the high voltage batteries didn't engage but I haven't found out why yet. Mark Turner (talk) 23:49, 23 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Well, if that's where things stand, I think the section about the switch should be brought to the end and worded as "one of the bombs" in such a way as to avoid giving an opinion which is being discussed. Wnt (talk) 00:02, 24 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Yes, we need to say there's confusion, rather than trying to second guess which way to call it. In terms of reliable sources, Hensen and ReVelle seem closest to the problem, but they disagree.

Excellent work, Socrates2008! Mark Turner (talk) 12:12, 24 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

PS: We now appear to have about 3 active discussion threads on this topic - can we please focus the discussion in one place (here is fine). Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:22, 24 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Pardon me if I'm violating the "not a forum" rule, but Wiki needs a real article on Nuclear command and control, not a redirect. Unfortunately, the doctrine was Born secret. --Pawyilee (talk) 13:36, 24 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

You could be bold and start one, otherwise put a request up at articles for creation. Socrates2008 (Talk) 21:41, 24 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

The aircraft broke up rather spectacularly, so perhaps the article should focus on that aspect, as there is another article on the bomb carried. I was at Barksdale Air Force Base between 1965 and 1973 during the Big Belly and Pacer Plank modifications of B-52D models. I was not involved, but know they discovered that all of the internal nuclear-bomb rack assemblies removed to be replaced by ones for conventional bombs, were ready to fall out on their own (as one had already done.) It was further discovered that ALL models in the entire fleet were subject to intergranular corrosion that could result in break-ups like the Goldsboro one. A direct result was that Wash Rack transformed from a very low to a very high tech job, and all aircraft maintenance personnel (like me) were required to attend Field Training Detachment (FTD) courses in corrosion control; and in particular, to learn to spot and report suspected exfoliation corrosion. —Pawyilee (talk) 14:29, 24 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Thanks for your note. While that's very interesting, we would require a verifiable source to be able to add content like this. Would you know of anywhere where this information would be available? Socrates2008 (Talk) 21:39, 24 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

One result from Dogpile search —Pawyilee (talk) 04:58, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

• Scott Rose (April 07, 2008). "Service modifications (Boeing B-52 Stratofortress Design and Development)". Vietnam Conflict Aviation Resource Center. Warbirds Resource Group. Retrieved September 25, 2013. .... The wet wing introduced on G and H models was even more susceptible to fatigue due to experiencing 60% more stress during flight than the old wing. The wings were modified by 1964 under ECP [Engineering Change Proposal] 1050. This was followed by a fuselage skin and longeron replacement (ECP 1185) in 1966, and B-52 Stability Augmentation and Flight Control program (ECP 1195) in 1967. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)

Rose apparently copied his entry word-for-word from Boeing B-52 Stratofortress. —Pawyilee (talk) 07:13, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

It has been suggested that the crew of the B-52 was tired and did not properly control the plane during refueling, which caused the wing to break off. Кучерена, Анатолий. Время спрута, page 45. Москва: Эксмо, 2015. Thomas.Hedden (talk) 00:26, 6 April 2016 (UTC)Reply

Two-man rule has no mention of aircraft. Development of the Permissive Action Link (PAL) was only a dream in 1961. —Pawyilee (talk) 15:51, 24 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

But PAL development was driven by accidents like this - looking for a good source that states it explicitly. Socrates2008 (Talk) 08:28, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

It is confirmed that neither weapon exploded. It is confirmed that that the arming sequence failed in both, but that failed SAFE, not BOOM. It is confirmed that some have speculated one almost did, but it has NOT been confirmed that the speculation accords with the overall design. —Pawyilee (talk) 04:22, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Aftermath section is lacking, so perhaps a synopsis of 1960s G and H model mods could be added there. So, too, a synopsis of the 2013 controversy over whether or not the weapons almost blew up. A separate Background section may or may not be needed, but background to why the aircraft was on patrol can be gleaned from Single Integrated Operational Plan#The first SIOP. —Pawyilee (talk) 07:20, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Why don't you roll up your sleeves and help then? Socrates2008 (Talk) 08:29, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Put ref to the first SIOP in Accident lede, and added that it (accidentally) included bombing China and Soviet-aligned states. Added Immediate aftermath for 1960s mods. Changed Analysis to Later analysis of weapons recovery, but didn't try to pull it altogether. Now it's your turn. —Pawyilee (talk) 14:39, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

• Here's one for the Aftermath section. Dobson's book claims something I hadn't considered before: this incident was the last time the U.S. military ever publicly confirmed the presence of nuclear weapons on an aircraft or ship. The policy henceforth became "I can neither confirm nor deny..." I'll see if I can confirm (or deny) this with a good source. Mark Turner (talk) 18:57, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

"Neither Confirm Nor Deny" presently redirects to "Nuclear ambiguity," so there's potential for expanding that into an article in its own write.—Pawyilee (talk) 04:53, 26 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

I have amended the location to show the centre point of the "circular easement", calculated using the details here: http://www.restorationsystems.com/uncategorized/whoops-atomic-bomb-dropped-in-goldsboro-nc-swamp-neuse-huc-02/ and the original easement documentation here: http://www.ibiblio.org/bomb/ease.html . 143.252.80.100 (talk) 16:56, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

The accident scene (2 bombs and aircraft wreckage) covered a wide area, so why focus on one pinpoint? Socrates2008 (Talk) 20:21, 25 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

Good point. Details on the weapons (preferred terminology to "bomb") should largely be in the W39 article. —Pawyilee (talk) 04:45, 26 September 2013 (UTC)Reply

"Weapons" is less specific than "bombs", and chiefly preferred by consumers and purveyors of same. -- ke4roh (talk) 10:57, 12 September 2014 (UTC)Reply

See also Wayne County GIS of the site. -- ke4roh (talk) 10:57, 12 September 2014 (UTC)Reply

> "ReVelle, speaking to a writer in 2011 of the bomb that he said nearly detonated: “As far as I’m concerned we came damn close to having a Bay of North Carolina. The nuclear explosion would have completely changed the Eastern seaboard if it had gone off.”^[1] He also said the size of each bomb was more than 250 times the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb, and large enough to have a 100% kill zone of seventeen miles. Each bomb would exceed the yield of all munitions (outside of testing) ever detonated in the history of the world by TNT, gunpowder, conventional bombs, and the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts combined.^[2]"

First: I don't see the "Bay of North Carolina" quote in the cited article. (It's nonsense but that's a separate issue here.)

Second: The bombs were indeed 250X Hiroshima, but extrapolating his off-hand comment about 8.5 miles into "100% kill zone of 17 miles" is a bit unfair, and it's not true at that. The range of ~100% fatalities zones for nuclear weapons is much smaller than people realize, and for a 4 Mt bomb it is "only" around a 5 mile radius from the bomb point.

Third: While it can be useful to put weapon effects into multiples of Hiroshima, multiples of "all TNT etc." detonated (which is about 2-4 Mt depend on who you ask), it would be better to use a tool like the NUKEMAP to extrapolate the actual possible damage in clear terms rather than this kind of hyperbolic approach. It would have been terrible if these bombs had gone off but it would not have been apocalyptic, it would not have created a bay, it would not have destroyed the state, etc. etc.

The article stated:

The aircraft, a B-52G based at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in Goldsboro, was on a 24-hour Operation Coverall airborne alert mission on the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. The operation was part of a larger Cold War program called the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). This early plan called for one third of the Strategic Air Command's fleet of nuclear bombers to be airborne at any point in time, so that in the event of war, the fleet would not be caught on the ground, and be able to fly directly to targets in the Soviet Union,^[3] China and Soviet-aligned states.

This was referenced to page 55 of B-52 Stratofortress: The Complete History of the World's Longest Serving and Best Known Bomber. The referenced page does not mention the Goldsboro crash. The Goldsboro crash is mentioned on page 60, but it is not said that the aircraft was involved in Operation Coverall. I have removed this claim. - Crosbie 20:41, 9 January 2015 (UTC)Reply

This is several years later, but I found a direct reference to this being part of Coverall. "Accident #3" on page 36 of this report is clearly (despite redactions) the Goldsboro accident, and associates it with a "Project Coverall operation": Defense Atomic Support Agency (1 March 1966). "Accidents and Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons (DASA Technical Letter 20-3)" (PDF). p. 36-37. NuclearSecrets (talk) 13:29, 19 October 2023 (UTC)Reply

I was a Nuclear weapons Officer in the Navy 1970-72. One of the pubs (^[4]) I had dealt with nuclear weapons safety and described all the US military nuclear weapons incidents and accidents through the late 1960s. It was classified Secret Nuclear Weapons Design Information at the time. It was interesting reading, especially since nuclear safety was my job.

It described the Goldsboro B-52 crash and the operation of the bombs. It has been 50+ years since I last saw it, but here is what I recall, with comments about problems with the current article.

1. The firing sequence involved the following actions:

A. A control box in the airplane sent an arming signal to an arming device in the bomb that was normally in a "safe" position that prevented detonation. This selected the type of detonation (high air burst, low air burst, impact and impact delayed. Any one of these options would allow a detonation. This device seems to have been referred to as a "Safe/Arm Switch" in some articles. This is a cause of some ambiguity in the accident descriptions.

B. The bombs were attached to weapons carriers in the airplane specific to that type of weapon. The bombs were delivered with a small Bakelite tab inserted into a slot in the top of the weapon. This insulating tab separated the contacts of a "Safe/Arm" switch that was in series with all other firing circuits. This is the "low voltage switch" referred to in some articles. This was a replacement for the original manually inserted Safing and Arming plugs used on early bombs.

The Bakelite tab was attached to a wire lanyard, and this lanyard was fastened to the weapons carrier when the bomb was mated to the carrier. This was a safety to prevent detonation during handling and while the bomb was in the plane. When the bomb was released from the weapons carrier the Bakelite tab was withdrawn to close the Safe/Arm Switch allowing the detonation sequence to complete.

C. The arming device started a timer that sequenced events. It deployed a series of drogue and main parachutes to retard the fall of the bomb to allow the airplane to escape the blast area. The timer also delayed activation of the radar proximity fuze to allow the bomb to be a safe distance from the airplane so the proximity fuze would not detect the airplane and trigger. The timer ignited the high voltage thermal battery "match". This melted the electrolyte, causing the battery to generate the voltage necessary to charge the firing circuits. The timer also fired the valve that allowed the tritium "booster" gas in the pressurized Tritium Reservoir to flow into the center of the hollow pit.

D. When the bomb fell to about the desired altitude a barometric switch closed to allow the firing sequence to continue.

E. At the desired altitude (or lower) the radar proximity fuze detected the ground and sent the trigger signal to the firing circuit. This fired the neutron generators and caused the thyratron switch to send high voltage to the detonators that caused the implosion, and the nuclear first stage detonated. This then caused the second stage lithium deuteride "candle" to generate the fusion explosion that produced most of the megaton+ yield.

These are the five "safety" steps often mentioned that would prevent an accidental nuclear detonation.

2. According to the report I read this was the actual sequence of events for the two bombs:

One bomb separated cleanly from the weapons carrier, closing the Safe/Arm Switch. However, the arming mechanism had not been activated so the timer did not start. This was the bomb that plunged into the ground and buried in the mud. The report made no mention of any of the circuits activating in this weapon. Most of the articles corroborate this, but there seems to be confusion because the arming device in the smashed bomb appeared to have switched to an arming position. That may have been due to the impact. Most of what I have read about this is confusing because it isn't clear if they are talking about the Safe/Arm Switch or the arming device.

The other bomb 1) received an arming signal (pulses) from the airplane control box as the plane broke up. This was supposed to be impossible, but it happened. It activated the detonation sequence. However, as the plane broke up the weapons carrier remained attached to the bomb, and 2) the Bakelite tab remained in the Safe/Arm Switch. 3) The timer operated, deploying the parachute, charging the battery and the firing circuit and sending tritium into the pit. 4) The proximity fuze was activated. The 5) barometric switch also closed. 5) The proximity fuze detected the ground and sent the trigger signal to detonate the bomb.

But because the Bakelite tab was in the Safe/Arm Switch the trigger signal did not get to the firing circuit and the bomb didn't explode.

Unfortunately, most reports confuse the sequences in the two bombs and we have several different accounts of what happened.

3. When I read this it really sent chills down my spine, and I have never forgotten it. It was only accidental that we didn't have a thermonuclear detonation near Goldsboro.

IF the armed bomb had separated from the weapons carrier the Safe/Arm Switch would have closed and the bomb would have detonated. Considering that the other bomb did separate from it's carrier, but fortunately was not armed, it seems to be a random chance that prevented the detonation. This is why the weapons system was pronounced unsafe.

Did the military hide this information from the public? Of course! Everything about nuclear weapons design, handling, deployment and use was either Secret or Top Secret at the time, ostensibly to prevent the Soviet Union from knowing how our nukes worked. Only people who had a need to know had access to classified information.

In the '50s and '60s it was thought that nuclear weapons personnel should know as much as possible about accidents and how they occurred so we could avoid similar mistakes and prepare to deal with an accident if it happened to us. Later in the '70s it was decided that this was unnecessary and I was ordered to destroy many of my Restricted Nuclear Weapons Design Information pubs, including the one with the accident reports.

I don't know if SWOP 20-3 has ever been declassified, or if a Freedom of Information Act request would turn up anything. It is also possible that the pub I am thinking of was another of the SWOP 20 series.

Prhays (talk) 06:57, 8 February 2020 (UTC)Reply

Greetings,

 Maggelet and Oskins include large parts of TP 20-3 (SWOP 20-3) in their book "Broken Arrow, Volume II" (2010). It was declassified and sanitized after an FOIA request. FWIW, Sandia Corporation post mortem analysis of the MC-772 Ready Safe Switch that Revelle handled showed that it was actually in the "safe" position, and that it could not pass an electrical signal (weapons were not pre-armed by AMAC). Additionally, the housing was distorted by impact, which led many to believe it was armed when it was actually safe.

2600:8807:84C2:0:8DAD:494:1F16:5EB0 (talk) 12:53, 14 February 2021 (UTC) Silverplate463Reply

There has been a tremendous amount declassified in the last few years on this. I have compiled the information, with citations, into this article. I have tried to impose as literal an interpretation as possible on it. I think the Sandia reports are pretty definitive about a) how an Mk 39 Mod 2 fires, b) what did and didn't fire on the two weapons at Goldsboro, and c) that it was indeed only "one switch" in the case of weapon no. 1 that was needed to fire (the MC-788 "safing switch" is not one that is armed by the pilot, it is one that is armed by the MC-772 ready/safe switch; the basic idea seems to be that if for some reason the MC-788 loses constant power before the weapon tries to fire, it won't fire). The only thing that still seems a little unclear to me is when the tritium is supposed to be injected into the primary; there is some indication that this has been still redacted from the reports, and it is not included as part of their "normal trajectory sequence".

There is a lot of back and forth in this talk page over the years about the Arm/Safe switch on Bomb No. 2. The declassification of the Sandia reports makes it pretty clear what happened here, and it neatly squares the circle of all of the different sources: namely, that it is true (as ReVelle said) that the switch visible said it was "armed" when it was discovered, but that this was because of damage sustained to the switch upon impact, damage which actually disconnected the visible indicator of the switch from its electrical contacts. So it did say it was "armed" — but it was not truly (electrically) "armed." That ReVelle would not have been told the last detail makes total sense as that was classified Sandia information and not something they would have updated the EOD team about, even though they appear to have figured it out pretty quickly (within a month).

Anyway, I have rewritten everything from the ground-up, essentially. I also do not think there is any mystery behind the "how close was it to detonating" — the quotes from the Sandia engineers in Always/Never are pretty clear on this, as is the Parker memo, both of which say that because the MC-772 functioned as planned, the weapons could not detonate, but there were plausible ways in which they could have malfunctioned, which in the case of Weapon No. 1 would have resulted in a detonation. I think the official accounts by the Sandia experts are definitely the ones to privilege here, as they are both pretty even-handed and non-hyperbolic, but they also acknowledge the real dangers that were involved, dangers that ultimately lead to much better safety standards.

Given that Maggelet and Oskin's book is a) self-published and inaccessible unless you want to spend a bunch of money on them (unlike all of the other sources), b) was published before many of these newer and more complete sources were released, and c) does not seem to say anything different from the above really (just interpret things differently, in a way that I think is obviously convoluted -- it is clear that, as the Sandia engineers have indicated over and over again, the reports say there was only one switch that actually mattered), I do not see any reason to cite them here.

Lastly, I added a bunch of images that I thought gave way more detail and credibility to the whole thing. Perhaps it is a little excessive. But I think they're all pretty great. In looking for a higher-resolution/crisper version of this image, which because of its use on Wikipedia has become the dominant public image of the accident, I discovered, a little to my horror, that that particular version had been heavily Photoshopped. It was taken as a screenshot from a film and I think what happened is the people making the film wanted a version of the image that would fill the whole frame, so they cropped it on the top and bottom and then used the clone tool in Photoshop to extend it horizontally. The cloning jumped out to me as I examined the image closely; it is not totally uncommon to have some clone tool "cleanups" on formerly classified photographs, because they often had various stamps on them that people (including those in the government) thought ought to be cleaned up, but as I looked at it I realized that vast areas of the left and right of the image were totally faked. It's kind of obvious once you look for it. Anyway, in searching for an "original" image, one that was good quality and clearly not manipulated in this way, the best I came across was this, which is probably a scan of the original image (it includes the same writing, which interestingly goes over the right edge of the image crop). The resolution isn't great, but I know the guy whose report it comes from (he's been helpful in the past in locating nuke imagery), and I've sent out an e-mail to see if he has a higher-res version. But it's better than a heavily-modified image which itself is just upscaled from a low-res scan anyway.

I also added this image, which is in Chuck Hansen's 1995 version of _Swords of Armageddon_, and is of the same bomb but from a slightly differently angle. I suspect that the coloration on the image is not original. All of the other photos seem to have been black and white, and if you look at it closely the color has that "flat" look of colorized black and white photographs (simple tints applied to specific areas. Because the version in Hansen's version is heavily discolored from exposure to light (it is yellowed; I auto-leveled it to make it a little brighter), I suspect this was a pre-Photoshop coloration (e.g., hand coloring on a photographic print). So it's got a little fakery to it itself (I doubt the Mk 39 was actually that color; all of the casings in museum displays are drab olive green), but whatever, it stands out a little better, and it's not a new fakery, so I'm OK with it for the moment. Maybe I'll grayscale it later. I don't know.

Anyway, I am just documenting all of this, because it's not obvious! NuclearSecrets (talk) 17:01, 19 October 2023 (UTC)Reply